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Anglican Theological Review



EDITED BY

FREDERICK C. GRANT and BURTON S. EASTON

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VOLUME XXXI

APRIL, 1949

NUMBER 2

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THE LEGACY AND THE TASK OF ORTHODOX THEOLOGY

By GEORGE FLOROVSKY

St. Vladimir's Theological Seminary
New York City

Address at the formal opening of St. Vladimir's Orthodox Theological Seminary and Academy, held in James Chapel, Union Theological Seminary, 4 November 1948.

Arnold Toynbee begins his *Study of History* with a question: What is an intelligible field of historical study? Intelligible, i.e. intelligible in itself or self-explanatory. Toynbee contends that no national history (at least in Europe) is self-explanatory, unless it is taken in a wider context, as an integral part of an inclusive whole. The proper and intelligible field of study would be, in Toynbee's opinion, only the Western Society or Western Christendom (of course, the U. S. A. included). But Toynbee emphatically refuses to go any further. There are obviously some other fields of study, namely an Orthodox Christian Society in the East and Southeast of Europe, an Islamic Society, and so on. But all of them are outside of the cultural world of the West and can be ignored in any historiosophical interpretation of the Western destiny. Western Society or Western Christendom is a self-explanatory or a self-sufficient realm. Toynbee admits certain external influences on the Western world, but he

dismisses all of them as 'exotic.' His instances are: Russian literature, Chinese painting, Indian religion.

All these considerations are highly relevant for our immediate purpose this night. Has really the Eastern Orthodox Society anything to offer to the West? Or should not any such offer to be simply disregarded and sharply declined as an "exotic" and dangerous intrusion upon the sacred ground of the Western Christendom? Have we anything to learn from this alien and foreign world? I mean, we Westerners, by birth or by adoption.

Can we agree with Toynbee's diagnosis and contention? There are plenty of reasons for doubt. In any case, both societies, Western and Eastern Orthodox, have the same ancestry and the same historical roots, and have succeeded to the same parental society, Hellenic and Roman. It would be inexact to consider them simply as parallel developments, for parallel lines have no common points, and our two societies have obviously at

least one point in common, namely their starting point. They are obviously offsprings of the same root. And again, they have had, in the course of their history, rather numerous points of contact, or collision, or conflict. One may call them sister-civilizations. And I venture to suggest, these sisters were Siamese twins. One knows but too well, that even with a skillful surgeon the separation of the Siamese twins is a risky and dubious operation. I am afraid this is precisely what has happened. The main feature, or rather the major tragedy of the European history, or actually of the history of Christendom, was that these two Christian Societies broke away from each other, and a historian runs a heavy risk of misconceiving and misconstruing the history of either Society, if he dares to ignore this basic fact. The point is that neither is self-explanatory, neither is intelligible, when taken separately. Both Societies are but fragments of a disrupted world, and they belong together despite the Schism. Only in the perspective of this Christian disruption is the history both of the East and the West truly intelligible. A self-explanatory character of Western Society is but a deceiving fiction, and a very dangerous and misleading fiction it is indeed. Western Christendom is not, and never was, an independent world, but a part or just a fragment of the wider whole. So is Eastern Christendom too. The only intelligible field of study would be Christendom as a whole.

To say all this is not to disregard the fact of disruption or to ignore the profound differences of East and West. But these differences and even divergences can be properly understood and interpreted only in the perspective of

disruption. Christendom was once united. The first break of unity was the schism between Constantinople and Rome. Can we really understand or explain the growth of the Papacy unless we keep in mind the perpetual tension between the two centers of power, the Old and the New Rome? It was a tension, of course, or a rivalry, if you prefer, but obviously it was not a rivalry of two foreign powers, but a rivalry of two bishops of the *same* Church. It was a competition for authority in the *same* world. The Patriarch of Constantinople claimed to be the *ecumenical* Patriarch, and Rome utterly detested and contested both the title and the claim. And the Eastern Emperor regarded himself as the only legitimate head of an universal Empire, i.e. of the Roman Empire. An Emperor in the West was for the East but an usurper. The whole history of the Middle Ages will remain for us utterly incomprehensible, if we fail to realize that East and West were but distorted twins. They were partners in the same historical quest. They were rivals often. And yet, rivalry or competition does unite no less than an alliance. The point is that both the West and the East are incomplete, while disrupted. The task of Reunion is imposed on both by the inner logic of Christian history. This is the spring of the *ecumenical idea*.

In the field of Theology disruption means a disintegration of Christian Tradition. For several centuries Christendom had been united in theology, under the uncontested lead of the Greek Fathers and masters. Western theology up to St. Augustine was basically Greek, though in Latin dress: St. Hilary, St. Ambrose, St. Jerome, all of them were but interpreters of the Greek tradition,

and even St. Augustine himself was deeply hellenistic in mind. Tertullian also fits easily into the same hellenistic frame. And then comes the doom over the West. There was a general eclipse and decay of civilization in the West just after Augustine. The Greek language was almost completely forgotten, even by the scholars. Augustine himself could not read Greek. Little of the Greek patristic heritage was available in Latin translations, and only very few of the later scholars in the West had access to the original texts. *Graeca non leguntur*. It is true, Greek influence was still strongly felt even in the darkest ages, but it was, as one modern American scholar has aptly stated, "an anonymous influence for the most part." Of course, St. John of Damascus was the leading authority for the whole scholastic period, and Pseudo-Dionysius has exercised an unparalleled influence on the Western spirituality and mystical theology. We have to avoid any oversimplification of the matter. And yet, an organic intercourse with the East has been broken, and the mutual estrangement of the separated halves of Christendom was rapidly and steadily growing. The whole importance of the Greek Fathers was recognized by the best Medieval masters and the lack of Patristic knowledge was painfully felt. "Numberless portions of the wisdom of God are wanting to us," says Roger Bacon in his *Compendium studii philosophiae*. "Many books of the sacred text remain untranslated. . . . Numberless books again of Hebrew and Greek expositors are wanting to the Latins. . . . The Church therefore is slumbering." Christian theological tradition was heavily reduced in the Medieval West. The broken balance could not be restored by a re-

covery or rediscovery of the venerable ancient texts or writings. The spiritual key to them had been lost. Still in our days the Greek Fathers are strangers and foreigners for the average Western theologian. It is completely forgotten that they were, and are to be, doctors and fathers of the Church Catholic and Universal, and not just the teachers of the East. It is but true to say, we are living now in an age of a Patristic revival. Greek Fathers are once more recognized as competent and safe theological guides in many quarters of the Christian West. And there is, in this rediscovery of the Fathers, a sure hope for a re-integration of Christian tradition, for a recovery of the true Catholic mind. And yet the success depends very much upon the right approach.

It is here that the Legacy of the Orthodox theology becomes of ultimate relevance and importance. Patristic teaching in the Orthodox Church is much more than a venerable tradition of the ages past. It is still alive, as it ever has been, in the liturgical practice of the Church. It is not only a matter for scholarly research or for a historical study. It is rather the normal atmosphere of the daily worship. The Orthodox Church is still keeping the key to the patristic treasures. It is not to say that Orthodox theologians have used this key often enough. Theology in the East has had its bad and dark days too. Patristic inspiration was strong and vigorous up to the final collapse of the Byzantine Empire. The Patristic age in the East was not closed or completed by St. John of Damascus. St. Theodorus of Studium, Photius, St. Simeon the New theologian, St. Gregory Palamas—to quote but the most prominent names—were in the same unbroken line. And

in the 14th century Byzantine theology was strong enough to meet and to stand the attack of the Thomistic scholasticism which had found its way to the East also. And then comes a break in the Orthodox theology itself. The Greek diaspora in the West was exposed to all the devices of the Western world. Theological teaching had been discontinued for a time in the subjugated Near East. There was a considerable period of eclecticism and confusion. One of the Ecumenical Patriarchs in the 17th century wrote a Catechism in the Calvinistic mood, which was of course immediately disavowed by the Church. On the other hand, a Romanising phraseology was often used, rather carelessly, and certain Romish opinions were adopted. The first theological schools in Russia, in the same 17th century, were Latin by language and rather Romanizing in spirit—Aquinas and Cardinal Bellarmine were for a time regarded as one supreme authority. Later on came a sudden change and for the whole 18th century the theological teaching in Russian seminaries and academies was based on Protestant authorities. Latin as the language of teaching was abandoned in Russian seminaries a little more than a century ago. It was an abnormal "pseudomorphosis" of the Orthodox Theology. But we have to keep in mind that it was the school theology that went astray—the worshipping Church kept close to the Patristic tradition. A certain tension, divorce, and opposition between piety and teaching was the most unhappy outcome of this historical adventure. This tension and divorce were overcome to a great extent in the heroic struggles of the 19th century.

The first impulse of renewal came, as it had come many times before, from

the monasteries. A revival of contemplative monasticism, on the basis of the strict Byzantine tradition, dates from the late 18th century and is connected with the name of Staretz Paisy, the great founder of monastic communities in Moldavia. He learned his way on Mount Athos. His numerous pupils migrated to Russia and succeeded in reviving and reforming the true ascetical life in many monasteries badly damaged and nearly destroyed in the age of Enlightenment. A long series of devotional manuals was translated into modern language and made widely available. A strong influence of this spiritual revival can be traced even in Russian literature, e.g. in Dostoevsky and Gogol. Later on this revival was linked and endorsed by a rediscovery of traditional religious art—I mean the rediscovery of the religious value of this art. For in the East religious art was always a kind of "theology in colors." An "ikon" is for the Orthodox not only a piece of beauty, and much more than a devotional symbol—it is no less a "dogmatic document," or rather a peculiar doctrinal witness. Ikonography, as a peculiar manner of religious painting, is a distinctive creation of Eastern spirituality. And yet, Duccio and Giotto, and later on El Greco (i.e. Domenico Theodotocopoulos), have learned very much of their religious insight in the school of Byzantine ikonography, and nobody would regard this as an "exotic" aberration.

The next venture was the Biblical revival, partly stimulated by the initiative of the British and Foreign Bible Society. But the real achievement in this field was the new translation of the Bible into modern colloquial Russian, with which the best theological scholars were

busy for a half a century, and which was published by the Holy Synod of the Russian Church in the sixties and seventies of the last century. Behind the whole work stood Metropolitan Philaret, bishop of Moscow for forty-seven years, a man of strong character, of deep piety and enormous learning, and a great preacher of his time too. His purpose and intention was to restore the Bible to the laity, to the people of the Church, and to encourage Bible reading at home. He was a great Evangelical in this respect, as half a century before him St. Tykhon of Zadonsk, a great teacher of the spiritual life. Both of them succeeded in merging this Biblical inspiration with unceasing loyalty to the Patristic tradition. It is of extreme importance that the pious laity in Russia took a very prominent part in this spiritual renewal. The true theological revival in Russia, again in the Patristic spirit, must be dated perhaps from a short pamphlet on the Church written by a layman, Alexis Khomiakov, about a century ago. (There was a remarkable affinity of spirit between him and J. A. Moehler, the great Roman Catholic scholar and historian.) It was a vigorous re-statement of the Biblical and Patristic conception of the Church, as being the mystical Body of Christ and an organ of the Holy Spirit. One has to add that all the most important writings of the Fathers, both Eastern and Western, were published in translation in the course of the last century and widely distributed. This translation was officially entrusted by the Holy Synod to the theological faculties and has absorbed much of time and skill and energy of Russian scholars. A series of valuable studies on Patristic theology

and early history of Christian doctrine has been published.

The last and a most distinctive feature of the Russian development in recent time was a return of philosophers to the Church and their attempt to re-interpret precisely the Patristic tradition in modern terms, to restate the teaching of the Church as a complete philosophy of life. It was a noble endeavor, and a daring and courageous one. There is no need to conceal all the dangers of this venture or the failures of those who run the risk. Unfortunately, this reinterpretation was unnecessarily linked with the adoption of German idealistic philosophy, of Hegel, Schelling, and Baader, and very much of unhealthy mysticism has crept into the schemes constructed by Vladimir Soloviev, the late Father Sergius Bulgakov, Father Paul Florensky, and perhaps most of all the late Nicolas Berdiaev. There is no need to endorse their findings and speculations. But it is high time to walk in their steps. And the unprecedented response which the religious philosophy of Berdiaev has provoked in the whole of the Christian world is the best proof that his message was not felt to be strange and "exotic." The standing legacy of this school is not their peculiar conceptions, but precisely their aim: to show and to prove that a modern man can and must persist in his loyalty to the traditional faith and to the Church of the Fathers without compromising his freedom of thought and without betraying the needs or requests of the contemporary world.

The task is perhaps more inspiring than the legacy. And the task of a contemporary Orthodox theologian is intricate and enormous. He has much to learn still before he can speak with

authority. And above all he has to realize that he has to speak to an ecumenical audience. He cannot retire into a narrow shell of some local tradition—simply because his Orthodox, i.e. the Patristic, tradition is not a local one, but basically an ecumenical one. And he has to use all his skill to phrase this ecumenical message of the Fathers in such a way as to secure an ecumenical, a truly universal appeal. This obviously cannot be achieved by any servile repetition of the Patristic letter, as it cannot be achieved by a Biblical fundamentalism either. But servility is alien both to the Bible and to the Fathers. They were themselves bold and courageous and adventurous seekers of the Divine truth. To walk truly in their steps means to break the new ways, only in the same field as was theirs. No renewal is possible without a return to the sources. But it must be a return to the sources, to the Well of living water, and not simply a retirement into a library or museum of venerable and respectable, but outlived relics. *Lex orandi* is, and must be, not only a pattern or authority for the *lex credendi*, but above all a source of inspiration. It is, and ought to be, not so much a binding and restricting authority, as a life in the Spirit, a living experience, a communion with the Truth, with the living Lord, who is not only an authority, but the Truth, the Way and the Life. The true theology can spring only out of a deep liturgical experience. It must become once more, as it has been in the age of the Fathers, a *witness of the Church*, worshiping and preaching, and cease to be merely a school-exercise of curiosity and speculation. This liturgical approach to Theology has always

been the distinctive mark of the Orthodox Church.

The Orthodox theology has, in recent decades, been speedily recovering from the unhappy "pseudomorphosis," by which it was paralyzed for rather too long. But to regain once more its own Eastern style and temper must mean for the Orthodox theology no detachment from the rest of the Christian world. What is to be rejected and repudiated in the Westernizing school of Orthodox theology is its blind subservience to the foreign traditions of the school, and not its response to the challenge of other traditions, and not the fraternal appreciation of what has been achieved by the others. All reaches of the Orthodox tradition can be disclosed and consummated only in a standing intercourse with the whole of the Christian world. The East must face and meet the challenge of the West, and the West perhaps has to pay more attention to the legacy of the East, which after all was always meant to be an ecumenical and catholic message.

We are perhaps on the eve of a new synthesis in theology—of a *neopatristic* synthesis, I would suggest. Theological tradition must be reintegrated, not simply summed up or accumulated. This seems to be one of the immediate objectives of the Church in our age. It seems to be the secure start for the healing of Christian disruption. An ecumenical cooperation in theology is already a fact; Roman Catholic and Protestant scholars are already working together in many directions. The Orthodox have to join in. Of course, this is but a very poor and modest preparation for a true encounter of the disrupted traditions in the fullness of truth. And yet, let us seek, and it will be given—let

us knock, and it will be opened. Let us hope and pray that the new venture which we are in all humility celebrating and dedicating this night may bring us,

with the help of God, closer together for the glory of our common Lord and for the consummation of His peace on the earth.

THE RESURRECTION OF THE BODY

By N. O. LOSSKY

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"The thought of the resurrection terrifies me," Repin once remarked. "Imagine walking down Nevsky Prospect and meeting Ivan the Terrible. Hello there! My, I shiver when I think of such a resurrection!"¹

Yes, of course the thought of a resurrection like this, with stone houses in the cities and Ivan mentally diseased, still possessing the power to torture anybody he wants, makes you shiver. This would not even be a resurrection, but just an absurd repetition, a metamorphosis of history into an evil infinity. A Christian, saying in faith "I look for the Resurrection of the dead: And the Life of the world to come," looks forward to a rational end of history. He believes that in the Kingdom of God each person will attain the concrete fulness of life, which gives the utmost bliss, and will realize completely his *positive* (not negative) *individual uniqueness*, spiritual, as well as physical.

However, the attempts to understand the preservation and even the perfection of existence after earthly death in its spiritual as well as its physical aspects are confronted with extreme difficulties. It is not surprising, therefore, that people have very different conceptions

of the resurrection. Many arrive at clearly fallacious opinions about the resurrection and sometimes even reject it completely. This last is true, for example, of Count Leo Tolstoy.

In this article I will discuss metaphysical side of the problem of the resurrection and I will attempt to show that this valuable dogma of Christianity may be included without any contradiction in the system of a philosophically developed conception of the world. The working out of a theory of the resurrection requires its connection with a whole system of philosophy, because it presupposes a definite theory of matter, soul, and spirit, and their connection with each other, a theory of God and His connection with the world, a theory of the Kingdom of God and the kingdom of our being. I will base this article on that conception of the world called concrete organic ideal-realism or personalism, developed in my books, *The World as an Organic Whole*, *Freedom of the Will*, and *Value and Existence—God and the Kingdom of God as the Basis of Values*. I will briefly discuss such fundamental aspect of this conception of the world as are necessary for the consideration of the problem of the resurrection.

First of all, we must learn to distinguish clearly the human ego (the

¹ V. Posse, *The Way of My Life*, ch. XXVIII, p. 465. (In Russian.)

soul, to use popular terminology) and its manifestations, i.e. feelings, thoughts, desires, and actions. Feelings, thoughts, desires, and actions possess a *temporal* form: they arise and disappear in time, they may be of longer or shorter duration, they may be continuously occupying a period of time, or they may be intermittent. The human ego (soul) has an entirely different character: the ego has no temporal form; it does not come into being and it does not disappear; it is neither long nor short in duration; it is neither continuous nor intermittent in time. We cannot ascribe these forms to the ego any more than feelings or desires may be yellow, blue, or green.

Feelings, thoughts, desires, and actions are *manifestations* of the ego; they may come into being only if there exists an ego which realizes them and comprehends them as "mine" (*my* joy, *my* desire, *my* action). The ego is the bearer and the creative source of these manifestations; the ego creates the content of its manifestations together with their temporal form, but is itself superior to each of its manifestations and also free from time: the ego is *super-temporal*.

Some manifestations of the ego, for example the pushing away of an ill-smelling branch of a plant, possess not only temporal, but also spatial form; but the ego itself has no spatial form, it is neither cubic nor spherical. The ego creates the contents of such actions as repulsion, together with their spatial form, providing the unity of an infinitive number of elements of such action, which are out of relation to each other. This is possible only if the ego is superior to or governs space, if the ego is *super-spatial*.

A super-temporal and super-spatial

being, which manifests itself in time and space, and which is the bearer of these manifestations is usually called a *substance*. To emphasize the creative activity of such a being, as well as its concreteness, I will call it a *substantial agent*. From what has been said already, it follows that the human ego is a substantial agent, capable of creating not only *psychic*, but also *physical, material* manifestations (for example, the action of repulsion).

Matter (substance), according to this theory, is not a substance, but only a *process* specifically a combination of the actions of repulsion and attraction performed by super-spatial agents. If a substantial agent inflicts repulsions in all directions from a particular point in space, he creates for himself an impenetrable extended body, conquering for himself, as it were, a part of space for his exclusive possession and thus creating for himself a physical body.

If the ego of a man, as a substantial agent, is the creative source of not only his own mental life alone, but also of his body, then it becomes clear that the ego itself, to be precise, could not be called either *soul* or *matter*; the ego is a *meta-psycho-physical* being. (This is the term that W. Stern, the author of that remarkable book, *Person und Sache*, uses.) The ego may be called soul only to emphasize the fact that in performing its physical manifestations, the ego subordinates them to its own psychic manifestations. Thus it then gives them a purposive, animated character, as, for example, when one deliberately pushes away a rotten branch of a plant due to a feeling of disgust.

All the beings that are component parts of nature, even those on the lowest level of development, possess qualities

similar in their fundamental aspects to the qualities of the ego. The most elementary being studied by modern physics, the electron, is a substantival agent which performs actions of attraction and repulsion in relation to protons and electrons. The definite direction of these actions, their difference in relation to protons and electrons—all this can be understood only if we admit that these actions are directed if not by psychic, then at least by *psychoid* (i.e. more simple than psychic, but analogous to them) strivings, efforts, and experiences.

Every agent is independent in so far as he possesses his own separate power of action, which he can exercise even for action against other agents. But at the same time on the other side of their essence all agents are so intimately welded together with each other that the conditions of one may be the object of the immediate experience of the others. They may be the object of intuition, sympathy, antipathy, etc. This immediateness of intercourse must be admitted because it is a *condition* of even the most elementary interactions, even such as repulsion, and not a *consequence* of them. This fact that one side of all agents is welded into one whole may be called their *abstract* (partial) *consubstantiality*.²

The world, consisting of agents who on one side are independent in their manifestations, but on the other side are partially consubstantial, may be conceived only as a creation of a *single* Super-cosmic principle, that is of God. One of the aspects of abstract consubstantiality consists in the fact that agents

effect their activities according to *identical* formal principles, forming a single world in a single space and time. The formal unity of the world may be utilized by agents for the realization of an infinite variety of activities. They may freely enter upon the course of loving union with God and each other, creating only such contents of existence as possess a character of absolute good—for example truth, beauty, moral good—which will give satisfaction to all beings. Such agents are members of the Kingdom of God, the Kingdom of the Spirit. But a free agent may also adopt a course, satisfying his own egoistical, exclusive “strivings,” oppressing the life of other beings, taking an attitude of competition and animosity towards them and sometimes even towards God. Then such an agent becomes a member of our kingdom of *psycho-physical* being, the realm of hostility, in which the agent commits acts of repulsion, thus forming a material (impenetrable) body.

An agent who sets his desire in conflicting opposition to the desires of *all* other agents exists in a state of isolation from them, and dooms himself to the use of his own creative powers alone. Thus, he is able to do only the simplest actions, such as repulsion. The way of escape from this scantiness of life is achieved by evolution, by gradually realizing higher and higher levels of *concrete consubstantiality*. Agents at least partially cease the struggle between themselves and enter into unions that become gradually more and more complex. In these unions agents of the lower levels of development accept the “strivings” of a more highly developed agent, and unite their powers for the achievement of these strivings under his

² See my book *The World as an Organic Whole*. English translation by Natalie A. Duddington, Oxford University Press, London, 1928.

direction. They become *organs* of a single, more or less complex whole. So an atom develops, then a molecule, a one-celled organism, a multi-celled organism, society, etc. Each successive level is the invention of a new, higher type of existence, making possible a more meaningful and variable life richer in creative activities.

In the composition of each such complex being we find: (1) the main substantial agent with his psychic (or psychoid), physical, and other manifestations, and (2) substantial agents subordinated to him, along with their psychic (or psychoid), physical, and other manifestations. The body of every complex being is formed from the combination of the physical manifestations (repulsions and attractions) of all these agents. The body of an atom, of a molecule, of a plant, animal, man, nation, planet, for example the Earth, etc., are formed in this way. In the physical body of every complex being we must distinguish two spheres: (1) *the central body*, i.e. the body consisting of the physical activities of the principal agent, and (2) *the peripheral body*, consisting of the physical activities that are realized by the joint action of the main agent and the subordinate lower agents, or even by the independent action of these lower agents. The words "central" and "peripheral" do not of course indicate here the spatial position of the bodies. The word "body" we shall also use to designate a group of substantial agents subordinate to the main agent. In order to distinguish these two meanings of the word "body," we shall employ the terms "*material*" body and "*allied*" body. The adjectives are not

necessary in most cases, because the context makes clear which body is the subject of discussion.

No matter how high a level of development the agent has reached, if he retains in himself even the smallest remnants of egoism, i.e. strivings for the relative values which are contrary to the interests of other beings, then between him and other agents disruptions remain, at least in a very slight degree, disruptions that oppress life and even destroy one form of it or another. Even in the realm of the peripheral body of such an agent, i.e. in his connections with the agents subordinated to him, absolute harmony is lacking, there is no complete union. The elements of his body themselves act partly against him or sometimes submit only under compulsion, but not because of complete unanimity with their master. Therefore in the kingdom of psychophysical beings, where there is no union of powers for collective creative activity and no full inner union with God, the fulness of creation, the fulness of being, and thus the perfect realization of the individuality of an agent are impossible. The more an agent isolates and excludes himself from other agents by his egoism, the poorer and more invariable his manifestations become, the less he is able to manifest his individuality.

The separation and struggle between the beings of the psychophysical kingdom of being, existing as they do even in the beings' own bodies, invariably lead to diseases and necessarily bring about such a sad but beneficial consequence as death.

Death, in the wide sense of the word, exists in our kingdom of being first of

all as *oblivion*, i.e. as the falling away of our experiences into the past.³

Next, in the biological sense of the word, death exists in our kingdom of psycho-physical being as a disruption of the union between the principal agent and the lower agents subordinated to him. Death is the consequence of that enmity and struggle which remain, at least in small part, in the relations of beings who have not completely given up their egoistically exclusive strivings. Sooner or later they are torn away from each other either by external force, for example by the blow of a bullet, or by the inner disagreement of their strivings, for example when the cells of the body begin to grow anarchically in a cancer or a sarcoma. This type of death, which we take to be almost the greatest evil, is really a derivative evil, arising as a natural consequence of the primordial fundamental evil, abandonment by the agent of the Absolute Good and his entrance upon the course of egoistic exclusiveness. Like any derivative evil, death is not only a negative phenomenon, but also a positive good. It frees the agent from the union (body) of the lower order, and opens the way for him to build a higher body with the experience acquired in the earthly life.

Biological death is only *physical* death: the agent loses his body, but being himself a super-temporal and super-spatial ego he cannot be removed from the composition of existence by any cosmic powers. Having lost his body, i.e. the connection with one group of allies, he is able to start building for himself a new body, i.e. to acquire for himself new allies.

³ Concerning this type of death, see *The World as an Organic Whole*, ch. VII.

We also should take notice of the fact that physical death is only a *partial* loss of the body. Only the peripheral body is lost, but the central body, i.e. activities in space, performed by the central agent or the human ego itself, repulsions, attractions, creations of qualities that can be felt, continue. No external force can destroy the central body of the agent, because it is the personal manifestation of the agent himself. Leibniz, in whose system we find the distinction between the central and the peripheral body, says:

"I am inclined to believe that in every human, animal, plant, and mineral body there is a kernel of substance; . . . it is so thin (*subtil*), that it remains even in the ashes of objects burnt and can draw into an invisible center. This nucleus of substance in man does not decrease or increase, although its covering or dress is in the state of constant flow and is either decreasing or increasing, due to the air or food. Therefore, if the flesh of one man is eaten by other men, the kernel of each man remains just what it was and as it was, and, consequently the substance of one man is never consumed by the substance of another. If the limb of a man is amputated, this kernel of substance draws back to its source and preserves its movement to some degree, as if the limb were still present."⁴

It is even possible that those members of the union more intimately connected with the human ego, constituting, so to speak, a nucleus of the union, never leave

⁴ Leibniz's letter to Duke Johannes Frederick, May 21, 1671. *Die philosophischen Schriften von G. W. Leibniz*, ed. Gerhardt, Vol. I, p. 53; also his letter to Arno, 1687, Vol. I, p. 124. Later, when Leibniz worked out the conception of monads, he expressed these ideas in forms which were philosophically better developed. See for example *The Letter to des Bosses*, 16 Oct. 1706: "Entelechia corpus suum organicum mutat seu materiam secundam, et suam propriam materiam primam non mutat." Vol. II, p. 324.

their master even at the time of death. In that case the ego preserves not only the central body, but also a part of the peripheral body as well. Popular superstitions, according to which the soul of the dead preserves the bodily features, seem from this point of view to contain a core of truth. Leibniz expresses the theory of the part played by the peripheral body as follows: "There is never absolute generation or perfect death in the strict sense, consisting in the separation of the soul from the body. What is called generation is development and growth, and what we call death is envelopment and diminution."⁵

Complete freedom from physical death is possible only for agents permeated with perfect love for God and for all His creatures. They are members of the Kingdom of God. They have either never fallen away from God, or else because of falling away were reduced to the level of an electron, and perhaps still lower, but in the long process of normal evolution (i.e. evolution according to norms, God's commandments) have conquered their egoistic exclusiveness and have grown in love sufficiently to have become worthy of God's benevolence, which has brought them back to His Kingdom. This evolution, as a growth in love, cannot be a process constrained by law. It is a series of *free* acts of an agent. Therefore cleavages, falls, entrances into blind alleys are possible in the course of the evolution. In other words, not only normal but also satanic evolution, i.e. growth in evil, is possible.⁶

⁵ *Monadology*, par. 73. Quoted from George R. Montgomery's translation. See the same doctrine in J. Ward's *The Realm of Ends, or Pluralism and Theism* (ch. xix).

⁶ See my article "The Limits of Evolution," in the *Journal of Philosophical Studies*, the

Members of the Kingdom of God, since they do not enter into the relation of opposition with anybody, commit no acts of repulsion in space. Hence they do not have material (impenetrable) bodies. Their *transfigured* bodies consist only of the manifestations of light, sound, warmth, etc. These bodies do not exclude each other and are not egoistically isolated, but are capable of interpenetration. Having attained concrete consubstantiality, i.e. accepting each other's strivings and the counsels of the Divine Wisdom, they *collectively create* the Kingdom of perfect Beauty and every Good. They even build their own bodies in such a way that being interpenetrable, they are not in their exclusive possession, but serve all, complementing each other and forming individual totalities, which are organs of the all-embracing whole of the Kingdom of God. The voluntary and loving unanimity of the members of the Kingdom of God is so great, that they all form, we may say, "One Body and One Spirit" (St. Paul, Eph. 4:4).

Members of the Kingdom of God extend their love also to the members who have fallen away from God, and form the kingdom of psycho-physical being. Being in the state of communion with the life of God, they possess the all-embracing power of attention, memory, etc., and take part in the life of the whole world, so that the whole world, *in so far as there is some good preserved in it*, serves them as a body. Consequently they, like the Lord Jesus Christ, possess a *universal body*. However, in each member it has an individual aspect.

publication of the British Institute of Philosophical Studies, London, October 1927.

The theory of the universal body of the agent can be understood, I believe, only by admitting that the substantial agent is a super-temporal and super-spatial being. As far as the transcendence of space is concerned, its importance is well explained in the writings of that Father of the Church, St. Gregory of Nyssa: the soul is undimensional, he says, and therefore "it is no strain to an intelligent essence to be present in each of those elements to which it has once cohered; this blending with opposites does not split it up"; "the intelligent and undimensional is neither contracted nor diffused." A friendly connection and acquaintance with the former parts of the body are retained forever by the soul.⁷

The universal body of a member of the Kingdom of God is immortal. Its heavenly aspect, conditioned by the union of transfigured bodies, cannot be destroyed by the inner powers of the Kingdom of God, because the love of its members for each other remains unshaken. And it is out of reach of the external powers of the psycho-physical kingdom, of struggle, hatred, thrust, and pressure. A member of the Kingdom of God does not respond to hatred with hatred and does not perform acts of repulsion. Consequently a plot to push it remains a helpless attempt. The explosion of the infernal bomb in the Cathedral of Sofia would have gone through such an agent's unresisting body, as if it were a vacuum.

Even that aspect of the universal body which is conditioned by his connection with the psycho-physical kingdom cannot be taken away from a member of

the Kingdom of God. In this realm of his body profound disruptions may occur and the parts may fall apart from each other; even the physical death of earthly agents may occur, but a member of the Kingdom of God never withdraws his love from them and no matter how great the dissension is between them, He remains united with them all. He is like a mother, whose children quarrel with each other, but she remains united with them all.

In the Kingdom of God death in the wide sense of the word, that is death in the form of oblivion, conditioned by disruptions which are characteristic of the kingdom of the psycho-physical being, is also overcome. A member of the Kingdom of God, being closely connected with the whole world, stands above its disruptions. Hence in his memory there occurs the resurrection of all the past in its wholeness, and consequently he understands its absolute positive value.⁸ This re-establishment of the continuity of connection is an even more profound resurrection than the re-establishment of the body and its immortality.

The intercourse of the bodies of members of the Kingdom of God involves their complete interpenetration. In earthly existence the highest degree of interpenetration is achieved in sexual intercourse. As is true of every other connection of unanimity it leads to an elevation of the creative power of agents. However, sexual intercourse is the connection of agents in the organic union of a family, which is frequently accompanied by a more or less partial exclusiveness from the rest of the world. Moreover, it may even develop the character of a one-sided form of intercourse

⁷ St. Gregory of Nyssa, *On the Soul and the Resurrection*, part IV; *On the Making of Man*, part I. (Translated by H. A. Wilson.)

⁸ See *The World as an Organic Whole*, ch. VII, where I discuss positive value.

of the two agents which does not lead to the growth of a family. Then it becomes a perversion or lewdness which disrupts the aspect of the unity of agents, lowers their positive creative power, and does not bring them into the content of a higher whole. Not a shadow of these defects is present in the bodily interpenetration of members of the Kingdom of God. And to put sexual intercourse on a parity with it would, therefore, be sacrilegious. Precisely the diversity and all-embracing quality of the interpenetration indicate the perfect purity of the all-embracing love from any exclusive partiality; they indicate that it is directed only to absolute values, which give satisfaction to all beings who participate in them. In such love and in such intercourse the limit of happiness is reached without making consciousness and its judgment hazy. It is directly the opposite of any kind of licentiousness. It is as pure and fresh as the innocent kiss of a child.

Members of the Kingdom of God, besides their transfigured body, also possess a connection with the bodies of beings who have fallen away from God. Their intercourse with earthly bodies may be interpreted falsely, as we find in some forms of pantheism. Thus, we may imagine a being who, possessing the whole kindom of the psychophysical existence as its own body, would participate in all the sensual experiences of this kingdom. The titanic power of the earthly pleasures and sufferings of such a being is diametrically opposite to the ideal of purity of the Kingdom of God. Earthly sensuousness, like everything else that is founded on egoistic oneness, does not enter into the composition of the Kingdom of God, and the Kingdom of God does not accept earthly

sensuousness, since it is necessarily connected with evil.

Indeed, the denizens of heaven introduce the lower kingdom of the world into the sphere of their body through their love for all beings. But such love causes only the good to commune immediately with the Kingdom of God, the good which is realized in the earthly life, and which possesses a character of at least partial transfiguration. But all that is imperfect and earthly remains only the object of intuition and solicitude, but not of mutual experience.

The universal body of a member of the Kingdom of God, being all-embracing, does not possess the limited biological forms known to us. It cannot have a perfectly youthful appearance, as St. Augustine thinks (in the *Civitas Dei*); it will not preserve all its organs, although without using them (not having the necessary functions of earth), as Tertullian thinks (*De Resurrectione Carnis*, ch. 60 and 62); it will not redevelop hair and nails as St. Thomas Aquinas says (*Summa Theologica, Supplementum IIIae Partis*, Qu. LXXX, art. II).

Freedom from these limited forms, it seems, is asserted by St. Gregory of Nyssa. He says that the resurrection is the restoration of man to his original created form (*On Virginity*, ch. XII), it is the realization of his primordial 'form' (*εἶδος*) "in imperishability, glory, honor, and power," the realization of the honor, and power," the realization of the nature of man as the image and likeness of God.⁹ The transfigured body is free from all those shortcomings and imperfections that are the consequence of sin.

By a daring interpretation of the bibli-

⁹ Migne, *Patrologia Graeca*, Vol. 46, *De Anima et Resurrectione*, p. 157.

cal text as allegorical, St. Gregory of Nyssa asserts that the words, "Unto Adam also and to his wife did the Lord God make coats of skins, and clothed them" (Gen. 3:21), do not mean coats made of the skins of slain animals, but indicate that the body of man itself was changed after the transgression. It became an animal body and perishable (*Oratio Catechetica*, ch. 8). Childhood, old age, disease, sexual intercourse, feeding, elimination, death, are connected with this animal aspect of the body. In the resurrection-body there will be no animal organs (skins of animals) and no activities and conditions connected with them (*De An. et Res.*, pp. 148-157). But what kind of a body will it be in which there will be no organs of animal life? It will have no weight, says St. Gregory of Nyssa, and its other qualities, color, appearance, and form, will change to something more divine. We cannot even form any conception of its appearance, because its perfect character "surpasses sight, hearing and thought." And this is not surprising, since in this transfiguration "we shall all become one body of Christ" (*ἐν σώμα Χριστοῦ οἱ Πάντες γενώμεθα.*) *De Mortuis*, Vol. 46, p. 532).

The theory of the universal body is very clearly developed by John Scotus Eriugena. The Spirit of God, he says, stands above all space, time, and everything that exists; similarly the transfigured body of Christ "transcends the limits of all space, time and all limits" (*omnia loca et tempora, et universaliter omnem circumscriptionem excedere*). Referring to the teachings of St. Gregory the Theologian, St. Ambrose, and St. Maximus the Confessor, he says that "immortal and spirit-bearing bodies are not limited to any physical form, nor by any quality and quantity. That is due

to their complete union with unlimited spirits and because of freedom from the isolation of simplicity." Such are the bodies of angels; and such will be the bodies of men after the resurrection.¹⁰

To one who possesses the all-embracing universal body, who stands above all limits, the different partial, limited, transfigured forms are also accessible in accordance with his needs in intercourse with men and the world in general. Thus Christ after His resurrection appears to His disciples in a limited body. Similarly angels have appeared and do appear to men, not "*phantastice*," but "*veraciter*," that is, in reality, says Eriugena (V. 38).

Indeed, we may lay down a general principle: beings who stand above all limits can freely subject themselves to any limits, except those that are connected with evil. They may even perform actions which in themselves are unnecessary in the transfigured body. Thus, Christ after His resurrection took food, "not because He was hungry," says St. John of Damascus, "but for the sake of our salvation, to confirm the truth of His resurrection."¹¹

The universal body of a member of the Kingdom of God is profoundly different from the biological body that belonged to him during his earthly life. A doubt therefore arises as to whether you may call the constructing of such a body *The Resurrection of the Flesh*. The concept of the resurrection requires the *identity* of the lost with the restored body, as it is admitted and emphasized by all Fathers of the Church. And this is required despite the difficulties aris-

¹⁰ Eriugena, *De Divisione Naturae*, Bk. V, ch. 38.

¹¹ *The Correct Interpretation of the Orthodox Faith*, Bk. IV, ch. 1.

ing from the requirement due to the fact that during the biological life of man the particles of the body are constantly being replaced by other particles. Moreover, one particle may belong first to the body of one man and then to the body of another due to cannibalism (St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, Bk. XXII, ch. 12), or even in the process of a more complicated cycle of matter. (Count Leo Tolstoy in his *Critique of Dogmatic Theology* speaks of the body of a great-grandfather, the particles of which entered the composition of grass, and through the milk of a cow which has eaten the grass enter the tissues of his great-grandson.) Finally, the greatest complication lies in the fact that the bodies of the child, youth, adult, and old man are very different, and to select one of them as that with which the resurrection-body will be identical, would be arbitrary.

Unexpectedly, as it may seem, the exact and strict solution of these complications, with the retention at the same time of the concept of identity is furnished by the theory of the *Universal body*. Accepting the dynamic theory of matter according to which all the spatio-temporal aspects of the body (the impenetrable extended body, colors, sounds, etc.) are a *process*, we can speak of the identity of the bodies that have belonged to different periods of time only by considering the ideal, non-temporal moments of bodies. Thus we consider identity from two points of view, the identity of the substantial agents in their composition, and then the identity of their *idea*, their *eidos*. Even Tertullian says that in the resurrection-body the substances are the same, but their natures are different.

The universal body of a member of

the Kingdom of God includes within itself the substantial agents of the whole world, and, consequently also those that were in his composition when he was a child, youth, adult, and an old man. His body is a synthesis of all these bodies in an improved transfigured form.¹² Even the fact that the same particle, precisely the same substantial agent, which was first in the body of the great-grandfather and later in the body of the great-grandson presents no contradiction. This substantial agent is included in the universal bodies of both the great-grandfather and the great-grandson in different ways, but not in egoistic exclusiveness, since the bodies of the denizens of heaven are interpenetrated. Thus, we are not constrained to resort to a partial solution of the problems, as was furnished, for example, by Athenagoras the Apologist, who said that a particle is not connected with every body substantially, or by St. Augustine, who asserted that the part of the body eaten by a hungry man will be returned to its first owner, and to the second will be returned the particles lost during starvation, or else that the shortage of matter will be replaced by the omnipotent Creator (Bk. XXII, ch. 20). One who holds the theory of the universal body of members of the Kingdom of God can definitely assert the *identity* of the earthly and the resurrection-body, since *all that is substantial* in the destroyed earthly body is included in the totality of the heavenly body. Of course this identity is *partial*—the identity of the part and whole, inasmuch as the part is included in the whole—because every-

¹² As to the synthesis of bodies see *The Meaning of Idealism*, by Florensky, p. 56. (In Russian.)

thing that is earthly is only a fraction of the heavenly.

If every member of the Kingdom of God possesses a universal body and also, according to St. Gregory of Nyssa, "we shall all become one body of Christ," we may be disposed to think that the denizens of heaven do not possess individual bodies different from one another, or that possibly they will lose even their individual personal existence. As a matter of fact, however, St. Gregory of Nyssa defends an idea that is directly the opposite. He asserts that it is only in the Kingdom of God that the truly individual *eidos* of every man is preserved and is completely realized (v. 46, p. 157, *On the Soul and the Resurrection*). This thought is beautifully expressed by Eriugena, who sees the end of history in the state where "every being will unite with the Creator and will be one in Him and with Him, . . . however without the destruction or mixture of essences and substances" (Bk. V, 20). The individual character of the bodies of the denizens of heaven may be expressed by the fact that each of them is an individual aspect of the body of Christ, penetrating the whole body of Christ in a peculiar way.

My attempt to develop the theory of the resurrection of the body is not complete: I have spoken of the destiny of those persons only who have become worthy to be members of the Kingdom of God. However, Scripture speaks of two types of resurrection: "And they shall come forth; they that have done good, unto the resurrection of life; and they that have done evil, unto the resurrection of damnation" (St. John 5:29). The Fathers of the Church who wrote on this question say that he who has sinned in his body shall receive punish-

ment together with his body, for the evil committed. If we develop a metaphysical system in the spirit of personalism, we cannot deny the value of this assertion, and may even try to understand how such a resurrection can occur. Perhaps it is not necessary, however, to puzzle one's head trying to understand how such a low type of resurrection is possible as the final, eternal destiny of the sinner. The words about the eternal suffering of the sinner may be understood as a threat, as an indication of the sad possibility which will never become a reality for anybody, if all beings sooner or later will give up evil absolutely. Then we may hope for the *apocatastasis*, i.e. salvation for everyone. This thought is expressed by St. Gregory of Nyssa in a form not condemned by the Church. In his treatise *On the Making of Man* (ch. 21), St. Gregory begins with the thought that the good is capable of indefinite development, whereas evil "is limited by necessary limits"; therefore beings who have entered upon the course of evil, having reached its lowest level and not finding peace anywhere, will give up evil sooner or later and will turn to the good, so that God will be "all in all" (I Cor. 15:28).¹³

The discussion of the question of eternal suffering in any large gathering usually produces passionate differences of opinion, and usually leads to two extremes sharply contradicting each other. Some sadistically insist on the certainty and necessity of eternal suffering, although they do not ground their opinion sufficiently on any logical arguments.

¹³ For details of this theory see M. F. Oksaiuk's *Eschatology of St. Gregory of Nyssa*, Kiev, 1914, pp. 499-649. (In Russian.) A similar theory is developed by Eriugena in *De Divisione Naturae*.

On the other hand, others not comprehending the idea of sin, or even rejecting it, and reducing sin to the level of simply the lack of the fulness of earthly being, reveal a tempting kindheartedness and optimism, bordering on the condoning of evil. They assert that the eternity of suffering cannot be admitted, because it disturbs the moral feelings by its cruelty, and they are positive that evolutionary process in accordance with law necessarily elevates all beings to the kingdom of perfect being.

It seems that both of these extreme opinions are far removed from the truth, because they do not take into consideration the freedom of agents and the immanent character of the heavenly bliss and of the sufferings of hell. Indeed, the goodness of the love for God and for all beings, or the goodness of love for absolute values in general, may only be the *free* act of an agent, but not the product of evolution by any constraint of law. The freedom of this act presupposes the possibility of an equally free selection of the opposite course of behavior, that is, the movement away from God, and the possibility, for example, of pride that cannot bear anybody's supremacy over the agent himself. The first way in itself, due to its essence, immanently contains the greatest inner satisfaction and perfection of connection with the world, and frees the agent from physical suffering and death. The second way, due to its essence, in itself immanently contains an inner duality, inner suffering, and also an imperfection in its connections with the world, accompanied by physical suffering and death.

The pride of an agent who has fallen away from God and who hates God may be so stubborn that for him the thought of the benevolent relation of God to him, the thought of being forgiven by God, is the utmost limit of suffering. Satan himself does not want to be forgiven, Leibniz says.¹⁴ It is not surprising that such a being should experience an eternal suffering which is not placed upon him at all from the outside, but is an explicit and necessary element of the essence itself, of the course of behavior freely selected by him. Thus the suffering is fully justified morally. But on the other hand, due to the same conditions, there is always the possibility of the evil being turning to the good. There is the possibility of a deep repentance and the entrance on the course of the disinterested service of God. In that burning repentance, on moment of which with its intensity is equal to eternity, a sinner may repay everything at once "to the uttermost farthing" (St. Matt. 5:26), and be forgiven. It is natural for us Orthodox to believe in this *possibility of apocatastasis* and hope for it when we listen at every Easter Mass to the benevolent words in the sermon of St. John Chrysostom: "He who is late for the ninth hour, let him come forward, without any doubt or fear. He who has reached the eleventh hour, let him not be frightened by his procrastination. The Lord is full of mercy and He receives the last as He does the first. He soothes the one that came at the eleventh hour, the same as the one who has been working from the first hour."

¹⁴ Leibniz, *Confessio Philosophi*.

THE MARRIAGE CANONS FROM A BISHOP'S POINT OF VIEW

By WILLIAM APPLETON LAWRENCE

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This subject was assigned me with the understanding that the canons were also to be considered from the point of view of a Priest, and of a Chancellor. I shall try, therefore, to confine myself to the practical problems involved in the administration of the new canons by a Bishop. In order, however, adequately to understand these canons, it seems to me necessary to have in mind the background out of which they came.

They have sometimes been called "miracle canons," being devised and passed in twenty-four hours. But it is my personal opinion that such a result could never have happened if it had not been for the previous twenty-one years of prayer and thought and study which preceded. It was out of the long labors of the years that these canons were born. They represent the climax of the efforts of a generation to present a canon which more nearly reflected the spirit of our Lord, who was as forthright in His condemnation of legalistic attitudes and actions, as he was deeply concerned for those who somehow had failed in life. For years, men had wrestled to bring forth a canon which would (a) give opportunity for personal and pastoral consideration to each individual case; (b) stress the spiritual rather than the legalistic attitude; and (c) emphasize the positive possibilities of Christian marriage as opposed to the tragedy of failure and divorce. It is only, I feel, in the light of these persistent underlying purposes that the canons can be intelligently interpreted.

As a Bishop, I think I may also claim the privilege of including in my presentation, the accompanying resolutions passed only by the House of Bishops, which implement and more fully explain the canons. There are six of these, and it might be well to describe them briefly as they are not to be found in the book of Canons.

The first set up a special committee of three Bishops, whose duty it is to obtain from Diocesans copies of judgments under Canon 17, to collate them, to publish findings, to give advice when requested, and to report to General Convention their recommendations as to amendments.

The second instructed the Committee on the Pastoral Letter to include a statement of the Church's steadfast purpose in holding to its traditional position on Christian Marriage.

The next two, passed by the House of Bishops but returned by the House of Deputies (not, it is reported, because they disagreed with them, but because they felt they were already covered in Canon 45), instructed all Ministers in charge of congregations to give to both adults and children regular instruction in the doctrine and discipline of Christian marriage. The second instructed the Minister to make the family a basic unit and objective of his efforts in his parochial ministry.

The fifth *recommended only* that, before solemnizing any marriage, the Minister require the parties to sign a document in which they state their

understanding of the Church's doctrine regarding marriage, and their intention to be faithful to it.

The sixth and last directed the National Council, through its Departments of Christian Education and Christian Social Relations, in cooperation with other agencies, to prepare suitable guides for the preparation of persons for Holy Matrimony, an office of instruction on the nature of Christian Marriage, the responsibilities and duties of family membership, and the doctrine and discipline of this Church in regard to Holy Matrimony; and to use every effort to obtain the use of such materials in the parishes and missions of this Church.

These additional resolutions seem to me to supply such an important emphasis and background that any consideration of the canons apart from them is incomplete.

With these two enlargements of the definition of my subject—namely, the historical background, and the Bishops' supplementary resolutions—I would set myself the limitation of keeping my subject to three points: (1) The Bishop in his relationship to the Canons; (2) The Bishop in his relationship to his Clergy; and (3) A Bishop's suggestions for the Future.

I. THE BISHOP IN HIS RELATIONSHIP TO THE CANONS

Here, it seems to me, the position of the Bishop is pivotal; indeed, he seems to have more authority in this particular relationship than he has in any other capacity except in the single instance of being able to accept a man as a Postulant for Holy Orders, but even here there is a medical check, and many following checks by the Vestry, the Stand-

ing Committee, and the Examining Chaplains. In the canon prepared and proposed by the Standing Committee of the General Convention, a Council of Advice or an Ecclesiastical Court was made compulsory. In the canon as adopted, such a group is only optional. How much this particular difference weighed in the decision, no one can tell, because there were so many other factors involved. It does seem to me, however, a matter which should have separate and much more deliberate consideration than it had at the time. Checks and balances permeate the pattern and practice of our Church, but here, so far as I can see, the applicant has no Court of Appeal from the decision of his or her Bishop. Dare we resist the infallibility of the Pope in matters of doctrine, and set up a system which seems to assume the infallibility of every Diocesan Bishop in marital relationships?

In even such a simple matter as defining "a member of the Church in good standing," is it just or fair that an individual who would be accepted as such in one diocese, be ruled out in another? Or, in such a basic matter as the interpretation of the canon, is it right and reasonable that petitioners should be penalized or privileged according to the Diocese or District in which they live? This question of the absolute authority of the Bishop, and the disparity of interpretation among Bishops, are highly debatable matters which I am simply presenting for discussion. I have neither the time nor the space to argue the pro's and con's in this paper, but I do think it may be helpful to such a discussion to present the findings of the special committee set up by the House of Bishops to collate the judgments sent to them.

In their first report to the House of Bishops, the committee reported that they had received 75 judgments from 16 dioceses. By January 1, 1949—after two full years, this number has been increased to 150 judgments from 21 dioceses, out of a possible 87—not quite 25%. In addition, they have received information from 54 replies to a questionnaire which they sent out. In their replies, all but three Bishops seemed to find the Canons workable and an improvement on the former discipline. There was an expected diversity of opinion as to the definition of "active member." A good many Bishops turn to advisers. Quite a few have constituted a permanent body. Only two reported marital courts established by canon. Practically all the Bishops insisted upon a personal interview with the petitioner. From the replies gathered, the Committee reports, "It seemed clear that the Bishops were regarding the administration of the canon seriously as a pastoral function, and basing their judgment upon the character of the parties, history of the former marriage, the alleged cause of the divorce, and the prospects of the proposed marriage, rather than upon evidence which would be presented in a civil court."

The majority of the cases reported had to do with an applicant who desired to marry a non-member of this Church whose previous marriage has been dissolved by civil decree. In classifying the first 75 judgments sent to them, they found that 21 could be described as war marriages, in which brief acquaintance and emotional strain were held to be barriers to free and complete consent. There were 20 cases where the Bishops had interpreted the canon to include causes arising *after* marriage as

destructive of the marriage bond. There were 34 cases where the judgments were based on the existence or non-existence *before* the previous marriage of one or more of the factors listed in Canon 17 as impediments.

In the later report to the Lambeth Conference, and more recently in January, 1949, Bishop Davis, the chairman, reports that these percentages are running about the same.

The divergence of decisions in the different dioceses may seem to some to be dangerous to the unity of the Church. As someone has expressed it, "The Church has set up moral and spiritual Renos." In order to find out whether this danger is real or imaginary, I sent a questionnaire to a sampling of Bishops of varied Churchmanship, all over the United States. From the replies received, I am convinced that although the possibility of large difference exists, actually the difference is far less than imagined. Those Bishops who render a favorable judgment when the facts seem to demand it, on the basis of causes arising *after* marriage, sometimes differ only in terms of definition from those who insist upon tracing these same difficulties as hidden factors incipient *before* marriage. I personally feel that as the central committee accumulates its judgments, renders its opinions, and gives its counsel to the Bishops the country over, there will be a gradual growing together in terms of procedure and precedence, and that a reservoir of information and experience will be compiled, which, based on the results of failure and success, will become more and more the accepted practice of *all* the Bishops.

To test the results in this Diocese, I wrote to all the clergymen where permis-

sion for remarriage had been granted, for a report. The one thing that impressed me most was the fact that in three cases the couples had failed to exercise the permission given, because, through the procedure of application and the instructions, they had been brought to a new sense of the seriousness of their undertaking. In one of these cases the rector, in reporting, said, "The marriage canon really worked out well because it gave these two people opportunity to think through and to talk with others about the whole matter." In another, the rector says, "In the conversations with the couple together, and privately with Mrs. F., they came to realize how important this marriage was and the elements it must possess."

In summary, therefore, I would repeat that I believe that the new marriage canons 17 and 18 need to be understood on the basis of the background out of which they came, and interpreted in the light of the resolutions with which they were born; that the canons quite rightly make the Bishop pivotal in his right of interpretation and decision; and although I believe this full right of interpretation should be maintained, I also believe that the spirit of our Church, which stands so strongly for checks and balances, demands some measure of protection for the petitioner, and some more definite requirement in terms of reports—compulsory rather than optional—to implement the responsibility of the Bishop to the General Church.

II. THE BISHOP IN HIS RELATIONSHIP TO HIS CLERGY

We have spoken of the Bishop as being pivotal in his relationship to the canon, in the sense that with him rests the full responsibility of rendering judg-

ment. But I believe that the great contribution and strength of the canons is the fact that they emphasize not what happens in the case of failure and divorce—the negative aspect—but go to the heart of the problem by emphasizing the positive aspects: the importance of preparing people for Christian marriage, of seeing that they are adequately instructed as to its meaning and possibilities, acquainting Church members with the privileges and resources which our Church provides in the sacraments and otherwise, and offering objective and Christian counsel when marital unity is imperilled.

The important factor in my mind about the canons is not how the Bishops will render judgment in dealing with persons whose marriage has failed. Much more important is the question as to how fully and seriously clergymen will fulfill those provisions which emphasize the teaching of the Christian conception of marriage and the preparing of people for it; and how largely the laity will use the Christian privileges which are the stay and sustaining strength of Christian marriage and of the Christian family.

The third resolution passed by the Bishops provided that "Every Minister in charge of a congregation shall give, or cause to be given, to both adults and children, regular instruction in the relation of the Church and the family; which instruction shall include the duties and responsibilities of membership in a family, the mutual obligations and privileges of spouses and of parents and children, and the Christian doctrine and discipline of marriage, together with the particular ministration of the Word and Sacraments and the work and worship of the Church of which the family and

its members have need for the fulfillment of the Christian life." This means that there must be a planned program in every parish and mission which will provide definite and sustained teaching, in the Church School, in sermons, in Lenten and Confirmation classes, and in pastoral calling, which is fundamental to the undergirding of Christian character and the Christian family. In this demanding task the Minister is to be assisted by the General Church through its "Departments of Christian Education and Christian Social Relations, which, in cooperation with such other agencies as may be involved, and in consultation with the Committee on Holy Matrimony, are instructed to prepare suitable guides for the preparation of persons for Holy Matrimony, the offices of instruction on the nature of Christian Marriage, the responsibilities and duties of family membership, the doctrine and discipline of this Church in regard to Holy Matrimony, and to use every effort to obtain the use of such material in the parishes and missions of this Church."

The course issued this year is the beginning of this material, and, I believe, gives good promise for the future. The General Church at last is tackling this tremendous problem of Christian marriage and the family, from a constructive and creative point of view. In this connection, we hope that the seminaries will take note of this new emphasis, and will make provision to equip the Minister adequately to discharge these duties, as well as impress upon him their great importance. The Bishop, however, must also be alert and sensitive to his responsibility to encourage and direct the clergy of his diocese, particularly in these early days when it comes as something new and added.

However, not only are all parochial clergymen charged with this long-range program to stress the general principles of Christian marriage, but they are also charged with the more immediate responsibility of definitely instructing the parties, when they present themselves, as to the nature of Holy Matrimony. In this connection, the minimum of the three days' notice provided, seems to me altogether inadequate, especially when provision is made for exceptions. The absurdity of doing anything significant in three days is quite apparent. This fact some clergymen have been quick to recognize, and there is a growing number of those who have returned to the ancient practice of publishing banns. Even the present provision, however, at least gives the Minister a chance to open up areas of personal interest and intimate understanding which can be used as a basis for re-opening the discussion and counsel in the days after marriage. We would urge strongly the importance of such follow-up. In all too many cases, once the marriage has been performed, the couple takes its place as just one of the many families in the parish, receiving perhaps a call once a year. It would seem that every clergyman should recognize that a couple starting off on this great new venture needs for a time extra attentive pastoral care. If the instructions have really touched spiritual areas, as they should have, the pastoral calls following will probably be more profitable than most, because of this earlier opportunity of entering their lives at such a critical and important time. As a minimum, in addition to calling, every Minister ought to make it a regular practice to remember couples on their first anniversary, urging them each year to read over the marriage serv-

ice together on that day, thus renewing their vows, and then to come to Holy Communion on the Sunday nearest that anniversary. I also feel that we might well profit from a letter written the couple at the close of a year, in which we would ask them for suggestions about what we had left out of the preparation, which they wish we had told them, as well as telling us what they felt had been most helpful in the preparation, that we may be sure to continue to include it. Of course, if the couple move to another parish, they should not only be given a Letter of Transfer, but a letter of commendation to the local clergyman should be sent ahead of them, giving him something of their background so that he will be the better prepared to receive and care for them.

At the time of marriage, another safeguard is suggested, but is not compulsory—namely, that the couple sign a statement indicating their understanding of the Church's doctrine regarding marriage, and their intention to be faithful to it. We have always had the admirable statement in the opening exhortation of the marriage service, but here we have something which is presented to a couple not when they are in a high state of excitement, as is almost inevitable at the opening of the service, but at a time when it can be considered and discussed at leisure, and which they are asked actually to sign. In the proper setting, such an act cannot help but be of influence in adding a sense of seriousness and importance to the occasion; and the fact that they have signed such a statement,—in which they declare that they hold marriage to be a lifelong union of husband and wife, and that they do engage themselves, so far as in them lies, to make their utmost effort to

establish this relationship and to seek God's help thereto,—gives them an additional tie and basis for sticking together in case of future tensions or possible dissension. In some dioceses, we believe that the signing of this statement has been made compulsory by canon, and in one diocese the Bishop has requested that it be done in triplicate in order that the couple may keep one copy, one copy being filed in the church where they are married, and one copy sent to the diocesan office for future reference in case of dissension. I believe that the canons certainly should be strengthened to make such signing compulsory, instead of optional, throughout the Church.

Still another obligation is laid upon the Minister by Canon 17, which says, "When marital unity is imperilled by dissension, it shall be the duty of either or both parties, before contemplating legal action, to lay the matter before a Minister of this Church; and it shall be the duty of such Minister to labor that the parties may be reconciled." It is important that the people should be informed of this provision, and that the clergy should keep records of all such cases. It may well be that the Bishop, later on, may need to know not only that such action took place, but the circumstances surrounding and the facts connected with the interview.

There is one more point in which the Bishop should have very close relationship with his clergy—namely, in the filing of the petition by the applicant. The canon seems to imply that the application be made direct to the Bishop, but so far as I know, the general practice, following the advice of the Bishops' Committee, has been to have the parish clergyman the one through whom all such applications are routed. This cer-

tainly would seem to be the correct procedure, because he is the one who is in the best position to provide the facts as to whether the person is an active member. He is the one, too, who will be in the best position to secure the information as to the attempts at reconciliation, as well as being the one who can give the closest objective judgment as to the cause of failure of the previous marriage and the likelihood of the success of the one contemplated. Quite rightly, a letter is usually expected from him, sent separately, giving his judgment as to the whole situation. This "screening" process, we believe, is tremendously important and absolutely essential for the successful working of the canon. It would be simply impossible for the Bishop to investigate all cases, because he would not have been living closely enough to the situation to obtain the necessary facts, to say nothing of the time which would be needed. All of these matters are naturally the responsibility of the parish priest. But, here again, some provision should be made to safeguard the petitioner from a priest with an extreme and narrow view, working in a diocese where the Bishop would perhaps interpret the canons in a more liberal way. I am not prepared to say just what should be done, but it does seem to me that this is a matter which should have fuller consideration, in order that Priest and Bishop may work together with harmony and understanding.

I would repeat, therefore, that whereas in the canons the position of the Bishop may be pivotal, the place and work of the Parish Priest is fundamental. On him has been placed the tremendous responsibility of implementing the creative and constructive aspects

of the canons. His work is basic. Upon the conscientious and full discharge of his responsibilities, the canons stand or fall. It is important that the Bishop not only realize this, but that he also take seriously his responsibility to see that the clergy fulfill the canons as set forth. It is his job to create such an understanding and liaison with his clergy as will provide for the full and harmonious discharge of all these duties and opportunities.

III. A BISHOP'S SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE

Here, let me say that I think the present canon is a great improvement over the former one. The Rev. Gregory Mabry, D.D.—who, I believe, was chiefly responsible for the compilation of the book, *The Marriage Canon*, issued by Bishop DeWolfe—in an article in *The Living Church* quotes an eminent metropolitan psychiatrist as saying that these canons "may very well mark the turning point for the better in American family life." That seems to me a rather superlative statement in view of the limited influence of our Church, but I do think that the canons mark a definite turning point in the practice of our Church towards a far more Christian approach to the whole question. I definitely cannot follow him, however, when he says, "The fact is that on careful study one is led to wonder if the minds of mere mortals could have achieved canons any closer to the Christian ideal," because I feel that there are a number of changes that may be profitably considered, and, I hope, eventually adopted.

I have already suggested that there be a clarification of what is implied by an "active member." The Committee has rendered a judgment that it should in-

clude "Baptism, attendance at worship with some degree of frequency, regular financial support by weekly or annual pledge, and genuine interest in and loyalty to the Church." If this judgment were passed by General Convention as a resolution, it might be sufficient, but I think it might even be made a part of the actual canon.

I also pointed out that I felt that it was desirable that the Bishop's absolute authority be somewhat modified, on the basis that no man, even a Bishop, is infallible. This might be done either by having a right of appeal to the Standing Committee, with sixty days additional allowed for judgment, or perhaps to a Provincial Committee composed of priests and laymen representing different dioceses within the province, with perhaps an additional ninety days allowance. The time and the inconvenience involved in such appeals would, it seems to me, keep the applications within the bounds of those who are desperately earnest in their loyalty to the Church and desirous of full justice.

I have also mentioned that I believe it is of tremendous importance that the canons continue to allow the two different interpretations. The committee, in its report to the Lambeth Conference, says, "The canons . . . state that Christian marriage is in intention life-long. . . . The canons then face the question, 'Must it be proved that incompetence to give free and complete consent existed at the time of the former marriage, or can it break the marriage bond in the Church's conception if it appears after the former marriage?' It is here, of course, that the interpretations of two great branches of the Catholic Church differ. The Roman holds that invalidating causes must be proved to have ex-

isted at the time of the previous marriage; the Orthodox holds that several causes can dissolve the bond. The Anglican Communion's tradition is more in accord with the Orthodox position, save that in the past the Anglican Communion has recognized physical adultery as the only admissible cause arising after marriage. . . . The canons are so worded as to admit of both Roman and Orthodox points of view, though they change and enlarge the tests from the legalistic and ecclesiastical impediments of the Roman law and broaden the Orthodox tests by emphasizing spiritual motivation." It seems to me vital that both these points of view should be maintained, and I am confident that gradually there will be a growing together, if all the Bishops are compelled to file their judgments with the special committee set up by General Convention to collate these judgments and to counsel and advise in regard to them. This compulsory aspect certainly seems necessary in view of the small percentage of Bishops at present practising the suggestion.

At the last meeting of the House of Bishops, the question was brought up as to what should be done in the situation where the applicant lived in one diocese, and the marriage, because the bride was resident in another diocese, was contemplated in the second diocese. At the meeting, a resolution was passed in which it was stated that "It be a condition of the judgment given by any Bishop that a marriage following judgment shall take place within the jurisdiction of said Bishop; or, if the marriage is to take place within any other jurisdiction, then the judgment shall be submitted for the consideration of the Bishop of that jurisdiction." This

was passed, as I remember it, without much discussion, as a matter of courtesy. Since then, I have come to the conclusion that this courtesy cuts directly and definitely across the principle that a Bishop is a Bishop of the whole Church. It seems to me, also, to impugn and impinge upon the validity of a Bishop's decision. As a matter of fact, when a Bishop, having reviewed the case, finally gives his permission, he gives it on the basis that no marriage bond exists and that therefore the person is in the same state as a single person who has never been married. To say, under such a situation, that a Bishop of another diocese can forbid a marriage from taking place, which in all other respects fulfills the canonical and legal requirements, would seem to me unjust, unreasonable, and improper practice. I believe that this action should certainly be reconsidered, and, I hope, revoked.

On the more positive side, I have suggested that the three days' notice required be increased to at least ten, and that the statement to be signed by those desiring to be married should be compulsory rather than optional.

I have also mentioned the importance of the clergy keeping records of such attempts at reconciliation as are brought to their attention, as well as the importance of all applications being routed through the parish priest—although here, I think, there might also be provision for direct application to the Bishop, if the petitioner feels that an injustice has been done him. In such a case, however, the reasons for the parish priest's refusal should certainly be required and taken into account, and his right of refusal to perform the marriage if permission is given, protected and respected.

It should also be made clear in the canons, as there seems to be some confusion on this subject, that the procedure and conditions shall be the same in the case of an active member who desires to marry a non-member who has been divorced, as in the case of an active member who has been divorced and wishes to marry again.

One omission, which doubtless was due to the haste with which the canons were passed, was the failure to make clear that no Minister of this Church may marry anybody who has been divorced except as provided in the canons, and that it applies to clergymen as well as to laymen. These matters, of course, should be taken care of.

In closing, I would reiterate the fact that I feel that this canon is a great step forward, because it takes the positive point of view and does not even mention divorce, or annulment, or remarriage, but stresses the spiritual aspects of marriage. I am enthusiastic about it, because it tackles the whole problem as a personal and pastoral one; it makes clear and definite and positive the Christian position that marriage is "a physical, spiritual and mystical union of a man and a woman, created by their mutual consent of heart and mind and will thereto, and is an holy estate, instituted of God, and is in intention lifelong"; and, as the Prayer Book says, "is not by any to be entered into unadvisedly or lightly; but reverently, discreetly, advisedly, soberly, and in the fear of God."

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

Introduction.

What is the mind of Christ on marriage?

What was the basic intention of those trying to change the Marriage Canon during the last generation?

Is the new Canon really an outgrowth of these endeavors, or was it a spontaneous emergence and outbreak of an entirely new approach?

I. The Bishop in his relationship to the Canon.

Should the Bishop's authority be complete and his decision final? If not, what limitations or checks should be set up?

Should "an active member" be more fully defined? How—by canon—by resolution? In what terms? Why exclude confirmed persons not in good standing?

Do you think this Canon is an improvement on the old Canon? Why? How?

Take a secret ballot of those present in a discussion group, to see how the percentage of liberal versus strict interpretation compares with the Bishops' judgments.

II. The Bishop in his relationship to the Clergy.

Do you think the Ministers are taking seriously and fulfilling pastorally the provisions of the Canon in regard to preparing people for marriage?

What is being done in Parishes in this regard in the Church School? in Confirmation Classes? in Y. P. F. groups? in Couples' Clubs? in sermons?

How much do the laity know about this Canon? What have the Clergy done to inform them?

How many parish groups (Y.P.F., Woman's Auxiliary, Men's Club, Couples' Club, etc.) have some aspect of marriage preparation in their program among members of the group?

Has your Bishop issued any statement, or given any instructions, along these lines? If not, has the Diocesan Department of Christian Education, or the Department of Christian Social Relations, done so?

What is the practice of the clergymen present in regard to the immediate preparation of a couple for Holy Matrimony? Do you have only one session, or more? How long? What general approach do you take? What general subjects do you cover?

How many clergymen present publish banns regularly?

What is the practice of the clergymen present in following up on marriages they have performed?

Is the signing of the statement of intention compulsory in your parish? Do you think that the signing of the statement should be compulsory by general canon or left to local option in the diocese or in the parish? What do you think of the present procedure as practiced in your diocese?

What constructive suggestions have you to make?

III. A Bishop's Suggestions for the Future.

Do you believe that the Marriage Canon represents "a turning point for the better in family life" in the U. S.? Within our Church?

Do you think there should be a provision for an appeal from the Bishop's judgment to the Standing Committee, to a Provincial Committee, or to whom?

Do you believe that the two interpretations should be allowed to continue?

Do you think three days' notice is sufficient? If not, how many days?

Are ministers keeping records of their attempts at reconciliation? Is this desirable?

Do you think a Bishop's judgment should be limited to his diocese, or reviewed by another Bishop if the marriage is to take place in the latter's jurisdiction?

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AN ANGLICAN STATEMENT ON THE THEOLOGY OF PEACE AND WAR

By SYDNEY A. TEMPLE, JR.

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The Church and the Atom. A Study of the Moral and Theological Aspects of Peace and War. The Report of a Commission appointed by the Archbishops of Canterbury and York at the request of the Church Assembly, London: The Press and Publications Board of the Church Assembly, 1948, pp. 130. 4 s.

In June, 1946, the Church Assembly passed a resolution requesting the two archbishops to appoint a Commission to consider the recent Report of the British Council of Churches' Commission entitled "The Era of Atomic Power." The Commission appointed consisted of sixteen leaders of the English Church including three Deans, the Principal of a Theological College, and the Editor of *Christendom*. That the members of the Commission did a painstaking work none can doubt though the important positive contribution which has been made to the study of war is presented in such a way that much of its power is lost. This is due to the fact that the constructive thought on the subject is relegated to the fourth chapter, after conclusions in regard to the atomic bomb have already been made on the basis of traditionalism.

The fourth chapter should come first, not only because the current scientific, cultural and political scene is set therein, but because the chapter begins with the consideration of the subject which the Commission was appointed to study. The opening words of this chapter, which really introduce the whole subject, are:

The use of atomic power against Hiroshima was described by the Commission of the British Council of Churches as "an event comparable to

the discovery of fire as one of the great turning points in history." We of the present Commission believe¹

The Commission wisely begins the consideration of the atomic development with a brief statement of the whole cultural problem raised by the scientific development which has led to nuclear fission. Though they hesitate to go as far as to suggest the coercive restraint of research in order to give culture a chance to catch up, a passage to this effect is quoted from Lewis Mumford's *Programme for Survival*.

The Emancipation of Science which came with the break of the wine-skin of late medieval scholasticism under the pressure of the new wine of the Renaissance, introduced a new period in religious thought as well as in mercantile and political institutions. The statements made at this point in the Report are penetrating, being suggestive of the position developed by William Temple and carried forward in the new study by Alan Richardson, *Christian Apologetics*. A true naturalism is pronounced:

Man's knowledge of God, of himself and of the world is a single realm, although within it each science has the right to seek truth by its own proper methods and without dictation of the conclusions it must reach.²

Men of the natural sciences have long demanded the right to pursue undictated conclusions for their fields, but they have been very hesitant to allow the same

¹ P. 73.

² *Christian Apologetics*, pp. 58ff, "The Method and Spirit of Theology."

right to those engaged in the study of theology which, as Mr. Richardson points out in his work, is a unique science with its own appropriate method and categories. The positive advantages of the emancipation of science, which, at long last, we are beginning to realize in the field of theology, were more than balanced by the problems arising from specialization, the Report continues.

The greatest fallacy of this movement has been the effecting of a fragmentation of truth, with the resulting multifidation of life. The immediate results are defined as threefold: (1) the specialist who concentrates continually on one set of abstractions comes to believe these to be equal to the whole of reality, (2) cut off from effective unity with other fields, there is a tendency for each science and art to develop an immanent ethic of its own invention. (3) such concentration becomes a particular danger when the aim of the scientist will come to include the conscious effort to extend human control over natural forces. The last probable result of scientific study is written large in the atomic bomb which resulted from the discovery of nuclear fission. Here the activities of the scientist or of him who is given the use of the scientist's discovery "cannot but be affected by the opinions he entertains concerning human life, the function of knowledge and the needs of society."³ In a recent address⁴ Sir Richard Livingstone, Vice Chancellor of Oxford University, points out the fact that the resulting difficulty is worrying the heads of schools which have tended more and more to specialized knowledge, which "provide the tools of civilization but give no guidance for their use."

Years ago Tagore wrote that Western Education consisted in a cordwood exercise. Instead of trying to understand or appreciate the whole tree, Occidental training consisted in cutting it up into usable lengths. Sir Richard Livingstone was recognizing this sin of the scientific West when he stated, "If it is too much to expect the Universities to formulate an ideal, they might at least have sent out men who would have done it, given the guidance for which the world is looking, and led it not only in economics and sociology, in physics and chemistry, but in even more important things. They have not done so."⁵ He would have agreed with the words of the Report:

The fragmentation of truth can only be remedied effectively, in the long run, by the redemption of society; in other words, by the incorporation of society into Christ, so that it becomes His body . . . for religion is the basis of human culture, providing over great areas of population and long periods of time reservoirs of common life, thought and feeling which have fostered the natural law and made for wholeness of life.⁶

The Commission was not content merely to state the problem, which it had done so briefly and well, but pursued the subject further to find promise for hope in the section titled "The Power of Imagination." The Report agrees with Dr. Richard Kroner, who stated that "Imagination is the architect of our future world, the intrinsic motor of our private and public life," because through this medium, "Man has access to the whole and is man thereby."⁷ This approach to the wholeness of life must play a great part in the subordination of power to human welfare and the release of

³ *The Church and the Atom*, p. 78.

⁴ *Some Thoughts on University Education*. Cambridge Univ. Press.

⁵ *Some Thoughts*, page 9.

⁶ *Report*, pages 82, 83.

⁷ *The Religious Function of Imagination*, pp. 8, 11.

the energies of peace. Thus a positive approach is made to peace from the point of view of the Laws of Nature. Though one may regret that other avenues were not explored, as for instance the path of Love as expressed in the New Testament revelation, the true direction is here shown. The Church's answer to the Atomic Bomb must be not a protest but something larger and more inclusive than the scientific effort which produced that machine of destruction. When the authors of the report turned to "The Political Problem" they were tempted by the easy excuse, "One cannot expect the Church to do anything effective until the world and every man in it is converted," but the larger vision was seen again in the last section of this chapter, "The Religious Task." Here the argument to this point was summarized.

Two world wars, aided by the ceaseless development of and reliance upon human inventiveness, have given opportunity both for orgies of destruction and also the lawless use of power over the lives and actions of men. The devastation caused, and the uprooting and deportation of millions of human beings into homelessness or slavery, are unparallel in human history. For the Christian the challenge of the hour is plain. It does not reside in the fact of war; it is not inherent in scientific development; it is not to be found in the happenings at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The challenge is in what lies behind the whole process—the claim that power is its own justification, that it is responsible neither to God nor to man, and that law derives from power, being the expression of the will of those who wield it.⁸

Neither war, nor the use of the Atomic Bomb are the greatest challenges, but they are the most important symptoms, for by these means states, or groups of people express their power. Through the preparation for modern war, every person is subjected in conscience as well

as person to the sovereignty of power. The way to express the dethronement of power in the present day is through the renunciation of war as a means by which states or groups of people may arrive at desired ends. Only by witnessing to such action can the Church bring the world to realize, in the words of the Report, "that divine law imposes certain irremovable limitations upon the rights and powers of all political authority." Yet when the members of the Commission at another place⁹ are willing to admit that total war may be needed as the only means by which five or six million Communists can be kept in bounds, they are in effect saying that they themselves still worship at the altar of power, on whom they depend to save their civilization and their Church.

After the present situation in the world has been analyzed, it is possible to turn to a review of the traditional attitudes toward war as they apply to this day of the dominance of power which is expressed most fully in total war. Chapter I consists of two sections, "The Lessons of History," which is "a précis of the statement made to the Commission by Dr. Arnold Toynbee," and "The Biblical Interpretation of History." The propositions arrived at are pertinent to the previous statement of the problem, for the "challenge" which each age presents, requiring a proper response, the Report says:

The consequential task which challenges us is that of achieving political co-operation and spiritual unity. . . . There is no national privacy; and the result is apt to be friction, leading to war. So the "challenge" is to develop such a spirit of co-operation and unity as will turn enforced proximity into a source of neighborliness instead of a cause of friction.¹⁰

⁹ P. 72.

¹⁰ P. 105.

⁸ *Op. cit.*, p. 100.

Neighborliness is not developed through fear, name calling, nor war propaganda against a people whose church is the second largest Christian body, the Orthodox Church. It may not be easy to love Russians nor to act as good neighbors, yet since this is surely the challenge of our times, the success of our civilization will not be measured (nor protected) by the development of greater military power, but by the development of greater understanding and love between the peoples where these sentiments are lacking. Therefore the Church is being untrue to her mission if she not only echoes the sentiments of political bodies which believe that power makes law, but even uses such Reports as this to add to the propaganda for the next war. (The threat of the Russians is again seen in the developing estrangement of the proletariat.) The main point of the second section, dealing with the Biblical Interpretation, is wisely based upon the statements of our Lord in Luke 15:1-5, where His words are taken to mean that "atrocities and accidents alike were events which had their chief spiritual significance in the fact that they called the whole society affected by them to reconsider its ways." As one reads this he thinks of the statement made elsewhere in the Report:

The importance of what is called the atomic bomb is that it throws a lightning flash which should reveal the darkness of the night to the most blind.¹¹

Are we still so blind to this greatest problem of the age of power, the murder of countless people and the impoverishment of the spiritual life of the whole world through a war economy, as revealed in sharp silhouette by the atomic explosion,

¹¹ P. 13.

that we are still unwilling to part with war as the means to protect . . . what?

It seems that the two chapters devoted to "Morality in Warfare" and "The Laws of War" are inserted as a footnote, made for the sake of traditionalists, but having no relevance to the main theme of the study. The argument of this section is possible, as stated, only by "setting aside for the moment . . . the wider theological considerations that are treated elsewhere in our Report."¹² As a result these sections consist largely in a guide for propaganda designed to justify any particular war and a set of "cricket rules" for the game of international killing. Taking as a very doubtful premise the position that the Church of England has "received" the doctrine of "the just war," an honest attempt is made to evaluate and to apply this questionable doctrine. It is noteworthy that the doctrine is admittedly one transmitted from the pre-Christian Roman legalism of Cicero through St. Ambrose who used Cicero's very title for his treatise on the subject.¹³ This in itself should be enough to warn the Christian that it is hardly applicable as a guide which is permanently binding upon the Church. Moreover the study of the theory as expounded most fully by Thomas Aquinas and his school led to the conclusion that:

Under the original and strict scholastic theory no war could possibly be just on both sides, but in practice each side could always put up an arguable case, and that is still so today.¹⁴

When the idea is pursued further it is found that it is no more tenable as held

¹² Pp. 30, 31.

¹³ Ambrose *De officiis*, I. xxxvi. 179. Cf. Cicero, *De officiis*, I. viii. 23.

¹⁴ P. 56.

by Vitoria and other sixteenth century scholars who revived the doctrine:

In the long run the canonists were driven to the conclusion which they had been most anxious to avoid, namely, that war could be just on both sides. (Technically a war could be "just in itself" on one side only; but the other side could be "excused from sin" because of invincible ignorance. *Vide Vitoria De jure belli*, (32, pp. lx. f.)¹⁵

The arguments of the scholastics and canonists are inapplicable today, as Archdeacon Hartill ably shows in the brief "Minority Report of Morality in Warfare"; because these were concerned with the actions taken by princes with the aid of a relatively small number of persons in the armed services. Modern war, on the other hand, is total war in which not only is every person of each state involved, but during which the whole basic conceptions of life are changed. The doctrine which concerned rules for the police use of a few thousand men has no reference to the modern problem of the war orientation of a whole people. Moreover, all the members of the Commission agreed that by reason of the morphology of war, the tendency of a conflict to change its character as it proceeds, even those wars which begin along lines which may be "just" do not continue so to qualify. In all examples of modern war the descent is "very easy—and very steep" by which "war that is undertaken in self-defense, for duly limited ends, and in a spirit of scrupulosity concerning means, develops into the pursuit, by means of unrestricted warfare, of absolute power over the destinies of the enemy."¹⁶

A real contribution to the honest at-

tempt of Christians to think through all the implications of modern warfare has been made by this Report, a contribution which far surpasses the narrow aim of discovering the Christian's attitude toward one weapon, the atomic bomb. On the basis of the beginning made, especially in the penetrating analysis of the fourth chapter, it is to be hoped that the Commission will be continued. Once the bow has been made to traditionalism it seems not out of order for Archdeacon Hartill to suggest "that the whole conception of 'the just war' should be abandoned and that the Church should start with the actual facts of modern war and consider them *de novo* in the light of the New Testament revelation of the character of the will of God. Such a study of facts would take account of the effects of modern war on the moral life of the communities involved in respect to sex-morality, truthfulness, honesty, and charity."¹⁷ That such an ambition is not foreign to the purpose of the other members of the Commission is suggested in the words which conclude the chapters devoted to the traditional justification of war:

It would seem that the recent horrifying developments of "total war" have their real basis in the 'totalitarian' conception of the state itself. . . . It may well be that the problem which this Commission has been charged to study can only be solved when it is realized that the divine law imposes certain irremovable limitations upon the rights and powers of all political authority.¹⁸

May this be taken as the agenda for the next meeting of a Commission which will benefit the Church by continuing a task which has been so well begun.

¹⁵ P. 58 and footnote.

¹⁶ P. 53.

¹⁷ Pp. 115, 116.

¹⁸ P. 72.

IMMORTALITY

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I

The question whether our life ends in death or not, is—if of any at all—of import not only for philosophers and theologians, but for every human being. Not only thirst for scientific knowledge, but also curiosity would like to answer it. It is of a directly practical interest and consequence. If we do not outlive the short span we pass here on earth, we would probably arrange our life in a different way—indeed, the content of morality and the very significance of morality would not be altogether the same. This at least is the feeling of the believer as much as that of the unbeliever. If man is not immortal, his alleged dignity, the gravity of his decisions, the stress we lay on character and virtue would, so it seems, no longer be justified.

"If death," says Socrates in the *Phaedo*, "were the end of all, the wicked would have a good bargain in dying, for they would have been happily quit not only of their body but of their own evil together with their souls. But inasmuch as the soul is manifestly immortal, there is no release or salvation from evil except the attainment of the highest virtue. . . ." This argument is certainly impressive. A similar argument persuaded Kant to teach that immortality is a postulate of moral reason.

Since this life on earth is obviously fragmentary and insufficient if we compare man's high vocation with his utter frailty and fallibility, we are morally urged to assume that another opportunity of improving our character will

be given to us after death. If death means absolute destruction of body and soul, man is really no more than an animal; he is a beast like all the other beasts, though more intelligent, endowed with greater ambitions and aspirations, and with the capacity of improving the conditions of his life. There is then no absolute difference between nature and mind, instinct and will, necessity and freedom—between the beehive and a human community. On the other hand, if there is such an absolute difference; if Plato and Kant are right in attributing to men moral value and dignity; if reason is more than an enhanced and highly developed animal intelligence; if the Biblical conception of man as created in the image of God is true; then—so it seems—immortality should be the consequence.

However, the great question cannot be answered in the affirmative before we have inquired the meaning of the term "immortality." Does it mean what the word suggests, namely a negation of mortality? Is death—at least the death of the soul or the self—a mere appearance? Do we not really die? Is faith in immortality therefore faith in survival—in a continuation of life though under new circumstances, on another star, in a changed fashion? Plato and Kant assume indeed something like this. Plato adopts mythical accounts about the life to come, Kant is reserved in his utterances;¹ but both agree that there is a life to come in which we, once more,

¹ In an early writing he suggests that we may live after death on another star.

will exert ourselves as we do on earth, facing new tasks, ever striving after the goal of moral perfection.

If that were true, death would not mean a critical and significant change. Certainly many things would be altered, but they would not be of moral weight. On the contrary, the moral conditions would be the same. It is evident that the Bible has an absolutely different view. Whatever "resurrection" may purport it certainly takes death seriously and does not ignore the moral impact of death. Precisely in the moral respect man will never be the same hereafter.

He will rise only to stand before the judgment seat of the Highest; he will be either accepted or condemned; no longer will he enjoy an opportunity of striving after the good, no longer will he be tempted to choose evil; no longer will he live that finite life which is ours on earth. The ultimacy of death is mirrored in the image of the Last Judgment. If he is accepted, he will participate in the holy and perfect life of God as a member of the Kingdom of Christ. If he is rejected, he will be sent to Hell. In any case, he will be thoroughly transformed and his existence will be completely altered—it will no longer be conditioned by finite limits.

Resurrection presupposes death. It makes death a real event. It is the dead man that rises again, not a man who survives his death. It is a renewal of life which indicates an intrinsic discontinuation. To be sure, there are words in the Gospel which point to the possibility that some of the followers of Christ may never die; but then the assumption is made that they are transformed and transfigured already before they die, since they will see the trans-

formation of earth and heaven and participate in the foundation of the Kingdom in which the frailty and fallibility, the finiteness of sinful man, will be removed.

The philosophers are more realistic when they speak of immortality than the Gospel is, in spite of the idealistic principles of both Plato and Kant, and in spite of the more realistic doctrine of the Gospel concerning the resurrection of the "flesh." Christian faith honors more than speculation the immense mystery that veils both death and immortality. The "doctrine" of resurrection is not a doctrine at all, if this term implies a kind of rational theory. On the contrary, the New Testament moves in a figurative or imaginative medium which clearly underlines the rational incomprehensibility of its contents. They are comprehensible only by the "spirit," and that means, by an imagination which responds and corresponds to divine revelation and is evoked by the Holy Spirit.

Paul therefore interprets the resurrection of the flesh in a spiritual sense. It will be a "spiritual" body that rises out of death—in other words, not only the soul, but the whole concrete, full personality we know on earth, will rise, but in a transformed, in a transfigured mode of existence.

Spiritual imagination alone can help us to understand this mystery. This imagination is not (as some of my critics have objected to my philosophy of religion) a substitute for, or a reduction of, faith—a kind of humanization of the Holy Spirit; rather it is the indispensable vehicle and instrument of faith itself, ordained by God who knows that neither sense experience nor speculative thought can ever grasp and penetrate the mysteries of life and death!

II

What does participation in the life of God imply? In what way shall we retain our personality and yet be transfigured and spiritualized? Can we say anything about this transformation revealed in Holy Scripture? Of course, no imagination merely of our own making can hope to elucidate the mystery of resurrection. But one thing we know: it means the final and eternal victory of the spirit over the flesh, of mind over nature, of Christ over human frailty and sin. It means the victory of God over the world, of eternity over time. It means that death as a temporal event, as a physical occurrence, is surpassed by the glory of redemptive love and of saving grace. It means that death has a moral and spiritual significance: it marks the absolute end of our temporal existence, of our finite conditions. It concerns our ultimate destiny. It is the door through which we enter either heaven or hell, eternal beatitude or eternal condemnation.

It is that door—not in a physical, not in any spatial or temporal, therefore also not in any historical or psychological, or, indeed, in any realistic sense; rather in a sense not to be described, and even not to be imagined beyond the certainty that we shall witness the victory of the Spirit. Since “participation” in the life of God necessarily outshines any fellowship or any unity with God we experience on earth, we may think of the human self as being so completely absorbed by and in the spirit of God that it would no longer feel itself as separated in any way from that spirit.

We do not know, however, and we shall never be able to know what this means in concrete terms, as we also do

not know what Paul means by the expression “face to face” (I Cor. 13:12). We can only anticipate that state when we remember the most ecstatic and exultant moments of our life. In those moments of rapture and transports of joy, we are aware and yet also unaware of our own self; we are as it were lost in the vast feeling of an over-whelming existence embracing all existence. But even this analogy does not reach the ultimate level; it only serves to set imagination in motion and directs it towards the transcendent goal.

This service is important enough. It has that “practical” function “postulated” by Kant, but in a more efficient way than Kant’s postulate of practical reason can ever claim; for it is not reason but spiritual imagination which here anticipates eschatological truth. The Critique of Reason may prepare this anticipation insofar as philosophy can prepare revelation; but the Gospel fulfills the postulate, it satisfies our “practical” need according to the suggestion of moral reason, and in a fashion even more consistent with the “logic” of eschatological truth than reason does.

Perhaps I may dare to go one step further in that direction. The “practical” need, precisely because it is not theoretical, does not concern the “problem” of immortality; it does not concern the immortality of “man” as a genus; rather it concerns the destiny of each of us in his most personal experience. In this experience death means *my* death; it means the end of *my* life, of *my* will, of the chance to improve *my* character. This “my” does not tolerate any substitute of a general concept. (This is the truth of existentialism, erroneously interpreted as the truth of a

philosophic system by the so-called existentialists of today.)

I face my death in a way no other faces it. My death means to me something completely different from what it means to everyone else: it means to me the absolute end of time, of all merely temporal aims, of finite sorrows and pleasures, of every relation to friends and enemies; it means the end of all this—except insofar as all this has implications transcending my earthly life.

What remains even when everything else passes away (as indeed it does when I die) is the transcendent significance of my personality and life. This at least outshines the final event of my finite existence; it is the bridge that leads from my earthly days to the unknown and unknowable "future" state, a state which is "future" only as seen from the earthly perspective but eternal as seen from the eventual perspective itself.

But what is of "transcendent significance" in my life? Certainly, God alone knows it, since God alone penetrates my heart. But this at least I myself know: what is morally significant here cannot be insignificant in the state to come. On the contrary, if anything outshines the earthly significance of myself, it is precisely the moral aspect of my character and of my actions. The Bible emphasizes this truth strongly and offers images that fit in its centrality.

III

There is still another key to the answer, though not with respect to my own life, because I cannot look at myself after death—I cannot know the transcendent significance of myself precisely because I cannot transcend the horizon of myself, as long as I live on earth. But I can transcend the life of those whom

I have loved and whom I have lost through death. Indeed, I do transcend their life by my very love and remembrance of them. In my own heart they continue to live—or rather, they rise again in a spiritual and transfigured mode. This "resurrection of the dead" within the loving memory may point indirectly at least to the other resurrection of which the Gospel speaks.

Since the immortality of those I loved in life is of even greater weight for me than my own immortality—or rather since I wish to be immortal mainly because I wish not to be separated forever from the beloved departed and from God (all other motives are selfish and without spiritual support)—I wish to settle all the moral disputes, to be reconciled to those I have hurt and to those I have hated, and most of all I wish to be accepted by a benevolent and gracious God whom I have offended so often and who has been angry with me for good reasons.

Is there anything in my experience of a cherishing memory that may indicate the fulfillment of those wishes? Certainly, the image of the departed becomes the dearer to me because he has gone. He can no longer defend himself. He can no longer fight. He is finished. The more I loved him, the better I esteem him now. His defects and failures are forgotten: his permanent value—his true self—remains and now shines unimpaired by his finite shortcomings. I feel deeper the eternity of his moral personality. I respect more the purity of his heart, the effort of his will, his unselfish and self-sacrificial deeds. I respond to his friendship and kindness now more freely and unhampered by little shadows. I see the inner center of his life as I never saw it before. Now

he has peace—in my own breast. Now he is forgiven—in my own judgment. Now he lives a transformed, a transfigured life! Memory in a way is redemptive.

This memorial resurrection may become the model of my hope. As I meet the beloved in my own soul, so I shall meet him in eternity—in God; so God Himself may embrace him. He is in a sense consummated within and through my love. The trouble and hate, the afflictions and conflicts of his earthly days have gone and remaining are the beauty and the glory of his “immortal” soul. The victory of spirit is the victory of love.

Indeed, this experience has a spiritual foundation. My love discerns the “eternal significance” of the beloved dead. In my memory this significance alone resists the destruction that death works. I settle, as it were, his self in the land where, in my own soul, God abides. The

departed and God fuse in my experience: he now dwells in that place within my own heart in which I also meet God. The abyss between his temporal existence and his eternal significance is filled.

Since I myself know that the same abyss with respect to my own existence will close at my death too, I feel that this eventual end of my life will be the beginning of a state which I anticipate with respect to the beloved one in my memory. And thus I can rightly hope that I will never lose him. For what does the word “never” mean here? It has an exclusively personal and immensely “existential” connotation: it means that as long as I live, he lives in me, and that with my death time will end for me and I will enter the same sphere of eternity in which I already meet the beloved one now; but then we will meet in God, who alone transcends time altogether and in whom alone eternity is finally and absolutely victorious.

THOUGHTS ON EARLY CHRISTIAN MONOTHEISM

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A Christian graffito found at Jerash consists of the abbreviations of the words *εἰς θεός Χριστὸς νικά*, "One God; Christ conquers."¹ This is typical of Christian faith and propaganda in the first few centuries of our era. The earliest followers of Jesus were monotheistic Jews, and within a decade they were joined by Gentile converts who were equally convinced monotheists. Belief in the one God was, in fact, one of the chief attractions of the new religion. Yet this faith was connected with belief in the divine triumph in and through Christ and the ultimate victory of the Messiah over all that opposes the will of God. *Χριστὸς νικά*.

The formula, in itself, would have been in no way surprising to a pagan. Take, for example, another inscription—this time from Sebaste, the Roman city on the site of old Samaria: *εἰς θεὸς ὁ πάντων δεσπότης μεγάλη Κόρη ἡ ἀνέικητος*, "One God, the ruler of all; great Kore [i.e. Persephone] the unconquered." The "one God" may have been Serapis, and as Hamilton remarks, "'One God' does not here imply a monotheistic theory; it is a stock phrase used in pious chants or acclamations to a popular deity."² The

difference lies in the background against which Christians used the phrase, and in the different associations which they gave it. "One God" meant to them very much what it meant to Jews.

Yet, as we must recognize, the worship of Christ, the custom of prayer through his Name, and the similar reverence paid to the Holy Spirit, are a modification of the simple monotheism of Judaism, and one can find in the New Testament the materials out of which the doctrine of the Trinity developed from the second century onward. We therefore have to ask how it came about that Christians assigned unique rôles to Christ and the Holy Spirit, and especially how they did so without the slightest thought that this could be in any way a weakening of their monotheistic principles.

We must first recall that systematic theological speculation was quite as foreign to first century Christians as it was to Jews. St. Paul and the other writers of the New Testament did a great deal of thinking, but it was not the rigorous, critical, philosophical sort of thought that we find later in Origen, Augustine, and Thomas Aquinas. If we would understand the reasons for the faith of these early Christians, we must, as it were, read between the lines of their letters, and inspect their habits and attitudes quite as much as the definite statements they make. It is necessary for us to use our imagination to fill out the picture, even while we recognize that in so doing we may make mistakes.

¹ *Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research*, 57 (1935), p. 8: ΕΙΣ ΘΕΟΣ ΧΡΗΣΤΟΣ ΝΙΚΑ. Erik

Peterson, in his monograph ΕΙΣ ΘΕΟΣ (Göttingen, 1926), gives many examples of Christian inscriptions of the types "One God and his Christ" and "Jesus Christ conquers" but none with precisely this combination.

² R. W. Hamilton, *Guide to Samaria-Sebaste* (Jerusalem, 1944), p. 29. Cf. also Peterson, *op. cit.*, pp. 227-238. The nearest parallel is: "One Zeus Sarapis; great Isis the Lady."

I

Christian theologians, when they wish to be precise, speak of God the Father, in order to distinguish him from God the Son and God the Holy Spirit. But in the New Testament, as in the ordinary language of piety, the term "God" ordinarily refers to the Father, the God revealed in the Old Testament, to whom Jesus prayed. Even though the attention of the New Testament is concentrated on Christ, God the Father is thought of as the absolute monarch and source of all. Jesus' own sayings preserved this monotheistic conviction as a permanent and unshakeable possession of the Christian church. It is notoriously difficult to say just how his doctrine of God differed from that of the prophets, psalmists and wise men, for every detail of it can be paralleled elsewhere. What Jesus added was a uniquely vivid and compelling sense of the presence of God and the reality of this ancient faith. What marks his sayings is not so much a new doctrine as a new and passionate vividness of apprehension. At all times he calls men to realize that God is living and victoriously at work, and demands that they think and live in the presence of this stupendous fact. Ethical monotheism, which for other men was a theory, or a source of pride, or a battle cry, or an occasion for mystical delight, was for him a fact which had just as immediate practical consequences as the observation that olives fall from trees or that water runs downhill.³ His ethics are simply the

consequence of his conviction about the Kingdom of God and the Family of God. Jesus demanded that his followers return good for evil, because only so could they imitate their Father as true sons; for he makes his sun rise on the evil and the good and sends rain on the just and on the unjust—not because God is indifferent but because he is better than the best that we know. So also with his teaching about faith. One offers such a prayer as the Lord's Prayer because God is an all-powerful and all-loving Father, and its petitions are conversation appropriate in the family. Jesus could speak of God's care for the lilies of the field, even though he looked forward to the possibility of his own death, because he was certain that God would satisfy every real need. What seemed to be absolute and final defeat in this life did not mean that faith in God was mocked. The Kingdom of God is likened to a man who sows seed and goes to bed at night and rises in the morning, while the seed sprouts and grows, he knows not how. It is man's business to sow the seed in full confidence that the time of harvest will come.

When the earliest preachers went out to herald Jesus as Messiah they stood upon this same foundation. The classical passage, Acts 10:34-43, proclaims the that Jesus (or the rabbis) appeals to "religious experience," "communion with God," or a mystical sense of God's presence. As H. J. Cadbury points out in *Jesus: What Manner of Man* (New York, 1947), pp. 42-47, our Lord frequently uses the metaphor of the absentee master. A sense of God's presence cannot be guaranteed; one must behave as though he were absent but might return at any moment to demand a reckoning. The point is Jesus' overwhelming conviction of God's sovereignty and personal attention to the world. Everything in life must be looked at in the light of this fact.

³ Jewish scholars are right in reminding us that much of this spirit is found in rabbinical sayings. The difference is that it controls *all* of Jesus' teaching from start to finish. It is a difference of degree so great that it can be called a difference in kind. I do not mean

"good news of peace by Jesus Christ," and its emphasis is on the historical saving work of Jesus. Yet, says the preacher, it is *God* who sent the word to Israel, preaching peace *through Jesus Christ* (διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, 10:36), who anointed Jesus of Nazareth with the Holy Spirit and with power (10:38), and raised him the third day and manifested him to chosen witnesses (10:40f).

The teaching of St. Paul differs from this only in emphasis. Though he links together "the grace of the Lord Jesus Christ and the love of God and the communion of the Holy Spirit" (or "participation in the Holy Spirit," II Cor. 13:13), it is God, the source of all, who did not spare his own Son (Rom. 8:32), who set Christ forth as an expiation (Rom. 3:25), and raised him from the dead (Rom. 8:11). God was in Christ reconciling the world to himself (II Cor. 5:19). Though the messianic king is to return in victory, the apostle adds: "Then is the end, when he gives over the Kingdom to God the Father and destroys every rule and every authority and power. . . . When all things are subject to him, then the Son himself will also be subjected to him who put all things under him, that God may be all in all" (I Cor. 15:24, 28).

The Fourth Gospel exhibits the most complete theological development in the New Testament. This book is, in fact, a recasting of the gospel tradition in the light of later Christian teaching, piety and experience. It is almost a creed in the form of a dramatic story, and while it no doubt contains early traditions, we quote from it not to establish Jesus' teaching but that of the Christian church in the late first century. Although the evangelist is concerned to

show that the Son possesses the Father's full authority, there are many statements attributed to Jesus which express his obedience and subordination. "If you keep my commandments you will remain in my love, just as I have kept my Father's commandments and remain in his love" (15:10). "I have not come of my own accord" (7:28); "I have come down from heaven, not to do my own will, but the will of him who sent me" (6:38). Indeed, the hallmark of Jesus' genuineness is that he makes no claims for himself but only points to the testimony which God has borne to him. "I can do nothing of myself; as I hear, I judge" (5:30); "If I glorify myself, my glory is nothing; it is my Father who glorifies me" (8:54); "The Father is greater than I" (14:28).

II

Yet this is only one side of the New Testament faith. Jesus, as Messiah and Son of God, occupies an absolutely unique place in the divine economy. In the first three gospels and the Book of Acts, he brings the complete revelation and is God's agent in establishing the final order. He is also invested with many of the attributes of divinity. One of St. Paul's letters contains a striking counterpart to the Sebaste inscription. "We know," he says, "that an idol is nothing in the world [i.e. corresponds to nothing real in the world], and that there is no God but one. For though there are, to be sure, many things called gods and lords, yet for us [i.e. so far as our conviction goes] there is one God (εἰς θεός) the Father, from whom are all things, and we are for him [i.e. made for his purposes], and one Lord (εἰς κύριος) Jesus Christ, through whom are all things and we are through him" (I

Cor. 8:4-6). There is a Lord existing alongside God the Father, but there is room for only one.⁴ Everything that God has done for mankind in the new age, and everything that is to be done in the future, is through the instrumentality of Jesus Christ and the Holy Spirit. The spiritual rock that followed the Hebrews in the wilderness, and from which they could draw water, was Christ (I Cor. 10:1-4). Although the Apostle never comes to the point of saying clearly that Christ is God, he believes that Christ and the Holy Spirit are involved in all the divine activities of creation and redemption.

The Gospel of John, with its full doctrine of incarnation, completes the edifice. The Logos (i.e. Christ) was in the beginning with God, the Logos was God (1:1), and all things came into being through him (1:2). He became flesh and dwelt among us, we beheld his glory (1:14), and it is through him that men become children of God (1:12). He is the way, the truth and the life; no one comes to the Father but through him (14:6). He who has seen Jesus has seen the Father (14:9). Jesus and the Father are one (10:30). Thomas, when he comes to full faith, cries out, "My Lord and my God!" (20:28). Although the fourth evangelist insists on the reality of Christ's humanity, he tells the story in such a way that the human element retires into the background, and Christ at all times exercises those powers which were thought appropriate for God Incarnate.

III

The earliest Christians, very soon after the resurrection, if not before,

⁴ Demonic spiritual beings exist, but they do not belong to the order of divinity (I Cor. 10:20f).

adopted an attitude toward Jesus' person and mission which led logically to this doctrine of incarnation. Historians and theologians have often tried to explain just why this happened. One of the favorite suggestions is that they were unconsciously influenced by Hellenistic myths of saviors, cult lords, and incarnate gods. This may help to explain why Christians used the terminology they did and why their faith won converts so quickly. They undoubtedly spoke of Christ in language that was not unfamiliar to them. But this does not explain the singular quality of the incarnation doctrine. There were many Greek stories of how heroes were born from the union of gods and mortal women, and of gods appearing in human form, as when Phoebus was shepherd to King Admetus. But never does a god become truly, completely and permanently human. Such a thing seems always to have been inconceivable to Hellenistic thinkers. While a man might be divinized and assimilated into the pantheon or sphere of light, no god—least of all the Supreme God—would ever condescend to divest himself of his divine attributes! To take one example, the two redeemers of Mandaeism, 'Enōš-Uthra and Manda d'Hayye, masquerade briefly as humans but never become men. As a matter of fact, the whole story of Christological thought in the first five centuries is from start to finish the struggle of the Greeks to understand the biblical point of view and to interpret it in terms of their own philosophy. More than one theologian found it quite impossible to believe in the union of God and man and therefore either divested Christ's humanity of any real meaning or else made Christ into something less than God.

The faith of the early Christians, then, cannot be fully explained as resulting from outside influences. What is the explanation?

Jesus spoke with a sense of complete certainty and authority. Leaving aside the difficult question of whether he called himself Messiah and Son of Man, and what precisely he might have meant by these terms, we can be sure that his first hearers thought of him as a prophet. His way of speaking and sense of authority correspond very closely to this. In their zeal to do honor to Jesus, Christians have often failed to remember that the office of prophet was (with the possible exception of messiahship) the highest category to which Jews could assign a human being. And since it was believed that the Law was perfect and complete, and that prophecy was a thing of the past, Jesus' followers took a bold step when they recognized him as a prophet.

But, unlike the prophets, who said, "Thus saith the Lord" or "oracle of the Lord," he spoke with a confidence that the intrinsic truth of his words guaranteed itself and needed no external attestation. He expected his disciples to follow his commands without reserve, not for his own sake, but for the sake of God's Kingdom and obedience to God's will. He not only heralded the Kingdom of God, he saw its power already manifest in his activity and that of his disciples.

Even before the resurrection, the disciples gave Jesus an unusual measure of allegiance and faith. They of course regarded him as the Messiah, though at first, like other Jews, they thought of the Messiah as a conquering national monarch. After the resurrection, they transformed the idea of Messiah to in-

clude the belief that this Messiah had been the Servant of God prophesied in Isaiah 53, and also that he would return on the clouds as one "like unto a Son of Man" to establish the Kingdom of God. The term "Messiah" thus expressed everything that had happened to Jesus and everything that he was expected to achieve in the future. He was thought of as the successor and fulfiller of Moses and David and the prophets, and the risen and exalted Lord who now shed forth the Holy Spirit of the church. He was intimately involved in all the mighty acts of God.

We can go further and say that the concept of Messiah was reshaped to fit the character of the historical Jesus. Messiah now had the features of the one who had taught and healed them, and whom they had followed and loved. He was much more to the early Christian than the majestic figure who should fulfil the promises made to the fathers. He was one with whom the individual Christian and the worshipping group could come into intimate communion. From this experience of fellowship came the moral strength to live their everyday lives by the standards of Jesus and to meet poverty, sorrow, danger and martyrdom with courage. The Book of Acts pictures the apostles as defying the orders of the Sanhedrin with the words "We must obey God rather than men" (5:29). On one occasion when Paul was in great danger, we are told that "the following night the Lord stood by him and said, 'As you have testified concerning me in Jerusalem, so you must also testify in Rome'" (23:11). The Apostle's own letters are filled with such words as these: "Therefore, since we have received this ministry . . . we do not lose heart. . . . We are perplexed but not driven

to despair. . . . For we who are alive are being handed over to death on account of Jesus, in order that the life of Jesus may also be manifested in our mortal body. . . . For the love of Christ constrains us, because we judge this: that one died in behalf of all. . . . If any one is in Christ, it is a new creation" (II Cor. 4:1, 8, 11; 5:14, 17).

This personal relationship, which St. Paul expresses by the phrase "in Christ" or "in Christ Jesus," is one of the most distinctive features of early Christianity. It is not a mystical experience in the strictest sense of that word. It is a devotion and personal relationship to one who was a fully human, concrete and specific personality, the force of whose character transcended all physical limitations and continued to control his followers after they no longer saw him. The courage and moral strength of the first disciples no doubt derived partly from the vivid memory of the days they had spent with Jesus before the Crucifixion. It derived also from their immediate experience of his presence as the Risen Lord. The two factors cannot be separated from one another except in theory.

What is most striking, however, is that later believers participated so fully in this twofold experience. Paul, who probably had never known Christ "after the flesh," is the most famous example of these. We can only speculate, but perhaps when Christians came to realize that moral character like that of Jesus could be propagated in communities of human beings, they concluded that believers became one with Christ and that Christ must be one with God.

If St. Paul's ideas were to any degree typical, it was a general belief that this relationship was established by the proclamation of the gospel, the inner re-

sponse of faith, and the decisive act of baptism. It was fostered by prayer, meditation, and the Lord's Supper. But these by themselves provide only the form or framework of the experience. It would have been possible, conceivably, to use similar institutions to establish contact between Isis, Asclepius, Demeter and Kore, and their respective worshippers. What distinguished Christianity from all other religions was the *content* of the faith, and this was determined by the historic personality of Jesus. The secret of the uniqueness of the Christian experience lies partly in the tradition contained in the first three gospels, which has in all ages imparted to Christianity its peculiar character.

The gospels are really very singular documents. They are fundamentally a proclamation of the mighty works done by God in Christ and therefore the story of Jesus' life, crucifixion and resurrection is central in them. The second element in them is a very full account of the teaching of Jesus. And this teaching is not merely presented as a new Law which will guide men to salvation. It is sometimes said that men and women were first converted by the preaching of the Cross, and afterward given the teaching of Jesus as catechetical instruction. But this is an oversimplification. The teaching itself is also a revelation of Jesus' personal character. It is an integral part of the story of his life. If we were to suppose that a teaching document like Q was at one time *the* Christian book of some early congregation, it was still in the true sense a gospel, and not a book of maxims. The character of the sayings bears this out. The opening words of the great Sermon are good news: "Blessed are the poor!" Without this record of Jesus' teaching the narrative of the cross

and resurrection would have been a stirring sacred story, but men might have failed to realize what kind of God had saved them. Indeed, the cross would have been incomprehensible.⁵

Yet, as we have already suggested, there is very little of Jesus' teaching that is strictly new. Much of it is a restatement of ideas and principles contained in

⁵ This paper was written before the publication of D. M. Baillie's *God Was in Christ* (London, 1948). I am encouraged to find that my thought was already moving in the direction of Professor Baillie's. I hope later to review this book, and at present will make only the following observations: (a) While some of the assumptions and methods of form criticism are inescapable, the specific, particular, historical figure of Jesus can be discerned through the gospel materials, and no satisfactory doctrine of the Incarnation can neglect this datum. I do not share the belief that form criticism must lead us to skepticism. (b) The Incarnation of God in Christ reveals to us God's character and means of operation and so gives us a vantage point for understanding the Old Testament revelation. This revelation is given not merely through the faith of the early Christians but also through what Jesus, as an historical figure, did and taught. For example, the God revealed by Jesus is a seeking, saving God who takes the initiative (Baillie, p. 63). He executes severe judgment on the oral Law, the ministry (priesthood, rabbinate, Sanhedrin), the Temple, and even the Chosen People itself. He has made them and he can reform or replace them. Indeed God is not much interested in institutions and social groups as such. They have value only as they do his work and minister to his people. Jesus in his teaching frequently pictures God as doing the unexpected and arresting thing, and he himself behaves in the same way. He is independent and unconventional. No respecter of persons, he frequently takes the part of the poor, the unrespectable and the sinful. Finally he dies on the Cross rather than be untrue to his own principles, which had already been to a great degree revealed through the Hebrew prophets. If the Incarnation means anything, these particularities in Jesus' teaching and action are the most specific and concrete revelation of God that we possess.

the Old Testament or in the sayings of the great leaders of Judaism. What is distinctive about it is that it is the quintessence of the old revelation. Out of a vast mass of tradition Jesus selected the basic truths, gave them an unforgettable expression, and held them up for all men to see. But this was not all. He made the revealed will of God the guiding passion of his life and lived it out on the stage of history.

As later disciples, such as the Fourth Evangelist, looked back at Jesus' life from the perspective of a few years or decades, they saw that if God were to come to earth and live out his own law, he would live such a life as they had seen in Jesus. Thus Jesus was, so to speak, the incarnation of God's Word and therefore of God himself. But at the same time he was not a mythical and impersonal redeemer. He was a definite character in world history. He lived in a particular place at a particular time. He grew to manhood in a family, spoke the Aramaic language, learned the Hebrew Bible, and participated in Jewish culture as a village artisan and prophet. Everyone who heard his sayings knew his concern for human beings who were in need and his denunciation of hypocrisy and cruelty. His attitudes toward the political and religious issues of his time were well known. Far from minimizing this fact, the earliest Christians accepted it joyfully. God had willed it so. And the practical results of Jesus' concrete historicity are clear: Jesus provided a standard by which they could evaluate and understand both the Old Testament and the new wonders which were taking place in their midst. There was no longer any reason for man to think of God as far off, or difficult to picture in the religious imagination. It may be true that "no one has seen God

at any time," but "the only begotten Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, he has declared him."

Jesus was therefore the ethical ideal of the early Christians and the complete revelation of God's character. He was also the judge who had full power to hold men accountable for all their doings. But, as we have seen, he was more than all this. He was the friend and companion who stood by his followers, defended them, and gave them power to perform the Law of which he was himself the embodiment. They did not claim to have achieved perfection through their union with Christ, but they did have a new footing and a new start in life which made possible a saving "righteousness not their own."⁶

IV

This leads us to the difficult problem of how, in early Christian thought, the Holy Spirit is related to the Father and the Son. For the New Testament often ascribes this new burst of moral and spiritual life to the activity of the Spirit. The concept of the Spirit of God is as old as the Old Testament and plays a not insignificant rôle in rabbinical Judaism. Early Christians held that the Spirit, who spoke in the prophets, had been present since the beginning of creation. But whereas in the Old Testament the Spirit of God was thought of simply as the manifestation of God's presence and power, his position in the New Testament is comparable to that of God and Christ. St. Paul does not draw a clear distinction between the Spirit of God and the Spirit of Christ, or between the

functions of Christ and the Spirit. It is only in the Fourth Gospel that the work of the Spirit is more precisely distinguished. There the Spirit is believed to guide the community of Christians into the whole truth. He will remind them of what Christ had taught, and he will never contradict the older revelation, but he will bring out ever more fully the meaning of that revelation, interpreting it in changing forms as need shall arise.

Many of the early Christians must have reasoned that when Christ came to earth, he divested himself of his divine prerogatives, and yet God himself did not cease to be God, nor did he diminish his power in any way. God the Father was constant and unchanging. Thus the Father and the Son were—to use later language—distinct persons. When Christ returned to heaven, to take his place of honor with the Father, the blessings which he had brought to mankind did not cease. On the contrary, the church was filled with a superhuman energy. Christian prophets appeared who preached and taught with unmistakable truth and power. Ordinary men and women were taken outside themselves so that they manifested qualities of love, courage and devotion that no one had thought possible. These manifestations of spiritual power were like those which Christians knew from the Old Testament. Therefore this must be the Holy Spirit, which Christ had sent from on high to guide and inspire the church.

It is easy to understand why Christians believed in two distinct divine persons. But why three? Why not think of the Holy Spirit, or the Spirit of Christ, simply as Christ's spirit? Again, we can only speculate, but three factors may be suggested, which, taken together,

⁶ St. Paul connects this new life with the Atonement made possible through the Cross. The Atonement doctrine is not touched on here, though it is of supreme importance, simply because it is beyond the scope of this article.

may afford an explanation. (a) The Holy Spirit did not begin his work with the ascension of Christ, but his activity was constant and continuous under the old covenant and the new. (b) It would be a mistake to suppose that early Christians, like some Elizabethan divines, localized Christ's body and presence in heaven alone. They were both too "spiritual" and too fluid in their thinking to restrict his activity so logically and completely. Yet they did think of his primary locality and base of operations as being in heaven, not in earth. He had said good-bye to his followers and they were waiting for him to return in glory. The Spirit supplied what was lacking by reason of Christ's physical absence. (c) Christians believed, as the Fourth Evangelist said, that the revelations of the Spirit could never contradict what Jesus had said, and yet the church experienced new bursts of life. New truths, and new aspects of old truth, were brought home to believers. Christian prophets delivered utterances which were often taken at face value as genuine revelations, though their content was not a repetition of anything in the Old Testament or the tradition of Jesus' words. And there were many other manifestations of the Spirit—"speaking with tongues," hymns and psalms, prayers, interpretations of Scripture, healings and exorcisms. Although the work of the Spirit was in accord with that of Christ, it was distinctive. Yet the Spirit was the authentic spirit of God. Hence arises the conviction reflected in the Fourth Gospel, that the three—Father, Son, and Spirit—were so integrated that they could not be separated, and it is out of this observation that the doctrine of the Trinity developed.

Classic trinitarian doctrine appealed both to biblical evidence—some of which

would not now be convincing—and to various philosophical considerations, such as St. Augustine's doctrine that God, being love by nature, must always have had an object for his love. Many of the later arguments are reasonable and appropriate, but they were not dreamed of by the biblical writers and should not be confused with the evidence of the New Testament. The purpose of the above remarks, furthermore, has not been so much to defend the trinitarian faith—although I sincerely believe in it—as to understand how and why it came into being. And here we must reiterate what was said before: the early Christians would have indignantly denied any suggestion that they were departing from genuine monotheism. Then, as now, the first and most important difficulty that had to be dealt with was the fear of falling into ditheism or tritheism. Of all Christian doctrines, that of the Trinity is the most difficult to restate in language which is both clear and theologically unobjectionable. The New Testament writers attempted neither a formulation nor a defense. They were content to proclaim what they had seen and heard. Christians such as the Fourth Evangelist worshipped and believed in but one God, teaching a faith which was not the denial of monotheism, but monotheism of a new order. According to their belief, there are distinctions of personality within the Godhead, but the unity of Father, Son, and Spirit is perfect, complete, and indestructible. The carefully balanced statements of the Gospel of John are the best example we have of this doctrine and our surest safeguard against tritheism.

NOTE:—The substance of this paper was first read in Jerusalem to a religious discussion group consisting of Christians and Moslems.

THE ETHICS OF THE FOURTH GOSPEL

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Somewhere in the writings of that subtle, penetrating, but unhappy essayist of the last century, Leopardi, occurs a passage on the significance for moral psychology of the particular sense attached, at times, to the term "world"¹ in the New Testament. As a general expression to cover false standards, vain pretensions, masked sensuality, cruel subterfuges, and other defects of society not bearing the stigma of crime, the word was well chosen to stamp their character, invoke a new principle of judgment and set them off against eternal values. To perceive the common factor in these defects, partaking both of motive and action, more especially in Graeco-Roman society, which was inclined to leniency towards what was not incompatible with the practice of the cardinal virtues, and then put it in a form to carry down the ages was an achievement.

Now this particular use of the term "world"² belongs so distinctly to the Gospel and First Epistle of St. John—though it is found also in the Synoptics and, more frequently, in the Pauline Epistles—as to compose one of the links between them. This special sense, needless to say, did not exclude, either in the original or in translation, the more normal meanings of "habitable globe" or "entire human race." The term "will", also of frequent occurrence in the Fourth Gospel, had, likewise, come late into the

Hebrew horizon. The "law" of God had long been a familiar concept. The interchange of law in the 119th Psalm with equivalent terms, particularly with "testimonies," suggested an advance in the idea of God's relation to man, but "will" carried it still further. The "law" had once been proclaimed; the "will" of God is active, now, then, always; immediate, personal intimate. A factor in the penetrating quality of the other three gospels, the word is even more potent in the Fourth.

The inward bent of the author's mind, as shown in his liking for these two words, should lead the reader to expect a different treatment of ethics from that of the Synoptics and put him on guard against mistaking such difference for the neglect sometimes charged against this book. A gospel is more than a treatise, but even in a treatise, precepts and standards are not the whole of the matter. Incentives enter in. The existing standards and needs of those addressed, as well as the other teaching available to them are all to be taken into account. Now when this Gospel was written, nearly half a century had passed since the founding, in Ephesus—one of the most enlightened Greek cities—of the church for which, in all probability, the book was first of all intended. St. Paul had made there his longest recorded sojourn, and the generation that had grown up since then was familiar with the Christian way of life and its demands. The Gospel of Mark was known to them and that of Luke was "already on the way to becoming a standard work

¹ This passage, long since stumbled upon, would now be hard to find. Leopardi who had lost his faith was writing merely as a scholar.

² It had in fact been anticipated several times in the Old Testament and Apocrypha.

in the Church of Ephesus."³ First Corinthians was in circulation among them, probably also other epistles of St. Paul. Even Hebrews and the Apocalypse cannot be positively excluded. Of the major books only Matthew's Gospel was lacking. It was open, therefore, to our author either to restate and enforce the teaching of these books or to build upon it. Happily, he chose to build.

Undeniably the Fourth Gospel contains nothing comparable to the Sermon on the Mount as a guide for the whole of Christian conduct; but parallels to most of its teaching are to be found in Luke's Gospel. The standards of Jewish morality are assumed, and the demand made for a righteousness that shall "exceed," and that shall spring from a right motive and a pure heart. The Great Sermon closes on the note of stability, with the parable of the Two Houses. The keeping of Christ's words is the test. In the Fourth Gospel, the idea reappears in the parable of the Vine, where the refrain of keeping Christ's commandments, so as to abide in His love, answers the refrain of abiding in Christ so as to bring forth fruit. The preoccupation of the Fourth Gospel is with the maintenance of the frame of mind in close relation to Christ; but this accent on fruit bearing, in which we catch an echo from the Synoptic Gospels, should not pass unheeded in a world so greatly in need both of literal and metaphorical fruit. A like note of practical ethics is sounded in the post-script chapter in the repeated behest to St. Peter, "Feed my sheep," a word of perennial stimulus to all holding office in the Church.

It seems a curious contention that love, which is regarded as the especial mark of this gospel, was thought of here only in

its exercise towards the little company of believers, not towards the outside world. For while admitting the bitterness aroused by the Domitianic persecution, among that little company of Christians would be some with friends and relatives for whose conversion they were hoping. Even a secret proscribed body in the First Century could not fail to have considerable intercourse with the pagan society from which it was constantly drawing recruits. Behind the group of recognized inquirers was still another engaged in pondering the matter. Moreover, was it likely that a writer deeply influenced by St. Paul, in a church of his founding, where his writings were read, should ignore the famous passage of First Corinthians? Or was that passage also to be conceived as applying to believers only? Dependent on love is unity, which is insisted on here rather more, perhaps, than elsewhere in the New Testament, though the keynote had long before been struck in Mark's Gospel by our Lord's behest to the disciples, after a dispute between them, "Have peace one with another."

Another virtue emphasized in the farewell discourse, but recurrent throughout the book is truth, often coupled with freedom. Matthew Arnold once expressed a doubt, whether, if Marcus Aurelius had been acquainted with Christianity, he would have cared for this Gospel; but truth and freedom were basic to Stoicism, and inwardness was congenial to Aurelius' temper. The stress on unity, too, might have appealed to the head of an empire made up of diverse tongues and races. It should appeal also to a generation aware, as never before, of the urgent need of co-operation within and between both churches and nations.

³ B. H. Streeter, *The Four Gospels*, p. 540.

Prayer, it is said, is neglected by the author. To be sure it is not enjoined; but chapters 14-18, besides giving us Christ's great prayer, abound in assurances that prayers will bring response.

As most of the ethical teaching, just shown to be in harmony with the Synoptic record, comes from these very chapters, where it is mingled with words of comfort and farewell that have been appropriated by Christians everywhere ever since, the question has to be faced how much of this discourse—without counterpart in the Synoptic accounts of the Last Supper—may be ascribed to Christ, how much is interpretation. The impress of the writer's very distinct style and subtle scheme of connectives, so different from our Lord's clear-cut reasoning, rules out *ipsissima verba*, but does it rule out the entire content? The omission of such a discourse from the Passion Story, drawn up as that was for apologetic and catechetical ends, should hardly be regarded as conclusive, especially in view of the events immediately following the Last Supper, and the decisions required for the guidance of the little band in Jerusalem.

There would be nothing singular in extended discourse at a farewell meal. Rather would it be strange for a religious leader, who saw his death approaching, to leave his followers without more words of comfort and guidance than the Synoptics report. Early in the Galilean ministry our Lord had referred to his disciples as closer to Him than His family, and the bond would have grown stronger with the months. It would not be strange if His words took a more intimate tone with them at this last hour than in His public utterances. Variations in the style of His teaching are met with even in the other Gospels. The

parables in the "L" part of Luke, probably as early of record as those in the Second Gospel, have a wider range of human interest than those in the latter. The saying in Luke 10:22, 'All things are delivered unto me of my Father,' attributed by Harnack and Streeter, though not by all scholars, to "Q", resembles the Johannine style so much as to suggest the possibility of other like sayings never reported. Then why might not part of this discourse also rest on some authentic tradition? If the prominence given to the Holy Spirit in these chapters seems not in complete accord with Synoptic tradition, still the rebuke administered in the Beelzebul controversy should indicate the place held by the Holy Spirit in our Lord's thought. And it is as the Spirit of truth that He is invoked. Moreover both Acts and the epistles testify to the actual experience by the disciples of the gifts promised in that farewell discourse. Gifts do not always imply previous promises; but, in the case of well-attested gifts, are the promises to be doubted because the record of them is *post facto*!

Even, however, if such a discourse be admitted, there is still room for conjecture as to how close the report comes to the original, how it was transmitted, whether *viva voce* or by notes, how it reached the author, or even whether sayings from other occasions, perhaps from the period of retirement, might not have found their way into it.

Now since the ethical standards and aims of the Fourth Gospel are found in consonance with Synoptic tradition, it may be expected that the incentives offered will be no less so. If reminded that there is no word about mercy and forgiveness in this gospel, surely the sayings, "Him that cometh unto me I will in

no wise cast out," and "God so loved the world that He gave His only-begotten Son," are as comprehensive, if not as vivid and dramatic, as the parable of the Prodigal Son. If not, why should the second saying be given a place in the Communion Service? Some of the prospective readers may have known the Lucan parables. New Testament writings do not mirror each other, or even collectively reflect the whole of Christianity. It is seldom said that repentance is neglected in the New Testament because for adequate expression of it on Ash Wednesday we turn to Job and the Psalms.

The Fourth Gospel⁴ opens and closes on the offer of light and life. Appeals for truth alternate with offers of peace, joy, and love. Incentives, indeed, are ever in the foreground, but presented not merely for acceptance but rather as a source of energy. Putting them thus in the forefront, the author merely carries a little further the methods of the other evangelists. Mark had begun the story of the Galilean ministry with "preaching the Gospel of God" and "gospel" did not mean commands. The enthusiasm of the multitude is hardly to be explained by the proclamation of high standards. Not jubilation, but awe and fear were the sentiments ascribed to the people at Sinai, where the requirements fell far short of those in the Sermon on the Mount. One may even wonder whether, if that Sermon had been substituted for the Jewish Law before St. Paul's vision, he would have felt the burden of fulfillment any the less.

Matthew's prelude to the Galilean ministry, "The people who sat in darkness

saw a great light," anticipated Christ's declaration of Himself as the light of the world at the Feast of Tabernacles. In St. Mathew's Gospel He offers rest to the heavy laden, and in the Fourth Gospel besides the weary those who hunger and thirst are invited. "Reward" is often promised in the Sermon on the Mount; yet for that difficult command, to love our enemies, a higher motive, the imitation of God is invoked. Discipleship, recognized always as a privilege, is raised to friendship in this Gospel and related to peace, joy, and eternal life, yet always with the obligation of following.

Ethics, indeed, in the sense of willing obedience to the commands of Christ and recognition of dependence on Him as Lord would seem more apparent than metaphysics in this book.⁵ Even the Prologue is not without bearing on ethics for the Logos doctrine is bound up with the purpose of Christ's coming into the world to enable men to become the children of God, a grace entailing obligation. It might even be questioned whether the significance of that doctrine lay as much in its advanced Christology as in the mode it afforded of reconciling with monotheism the fervent exaltation of Jesus after the Resurrection. St. Peter's call to baptism and proclamation of salvation in the name of Jesus, and, still more, St. Stephen's prayer and vision, suggest that Christological practice early in the day had so outrun theory that reason asked for a philosophical adjustment.

⁵ That the controversial chapters present peculiar difficulties must be admitted, without, however, attempting to enter on them in the present article.

⁴ Exclusive of the postscript chapter.

BOOK REVIEWS

L'Évangile de Jean d'après les recherches récentes. By Philippe-H. Menoud. Neuchâtel: Delachaux & Niestlé, 1947, pp. 91. Sw. Fr. 3.90.

Swiss Protestant scholars, writing in French and German, have in recent years published a remarkable number of solid books on New Testament matters. Like the Swedes, they have done much to fill the vacuum created by the disruption of German university life. The whole world has reason to be grateful to them.

Professor Menoud of Neuchâtel, in No. 3 of the "Cahiers Théologiques de l'Actualité Protestante," gives a thorough review of all recent literature available to him on the subject of the Fourth Gospel and other Johannine writings. He regrets not having seen Hoskyns' commentary—which he would have found extremely interesting—and the third editions of Strachan's and Howard's studies. One who reads Menoud and adds the books just mentioned plus the articles of Scammon in the *ATR*, XXIII (1941), 103-117, Goodenough in the *Journal of Biblical Literature*, LXIV (1945), 145-182, and a few other items, has an almost complete picture of the present state of Johannine studies.

After surveying the field, Menoud gives some of his conclusions on pp. 75-77. The following summary is drawn from those pages and from other parts of the book.

1. There is a general tendency against dissecting and rearranging the Fourth Gospel. "The fundamental unity of the book makes a greater impression than the incoherences in detail." Proposals to rearrange the gospel usually raise more questions than they solve, and attempts such as Bultmann's to distinguish sources have no linguistic basis. E. Schweizer, in his striking monograph *Ego Eimi* (Göttingen, 1939), has analyzed and listed the characteristic expressions of the gospel, and these are found throughout the alleged "sources" and the work of the redactor alike (p. 20). Even chapter 21 is probably by the author of the gospel, with the possible exception of a few verses at the end (pp. 21-24). Menoud inclines to the theory, represented in this country by the late C. R. Bowen, that the evangelist died before he was able to put his work into final form.

2. As for Windisch's thesis, that the Fourth Gospel was written to supplant the synoptics en-

tirely, Menoud takes a common-sense position: "The Synoptics and John are, so to speak, two formulations of the tradition, more or less parallel and contemporary, conceived and worked out in reciprocal independence" (p. 29).

3. The question has been raised whether John was influenced by an early form of gnosticism (so Bultmann), or whether gnosticism drew many of its leading ideas from the Fourth Gospel (so Ernst Percy). Menoud notes that many scholars adopt an attitude of prudent reserve. Ignatius of Antioch furnishes a better example of pagan influence (p. 42). Although John is acquainted with many ideas and terms found in gnosticism—especially in the Mandaean religion—he uses gnostic terminology for an anti-gnostic purpose, and the sources of his thought are the Old Testament and the Christian tradition (p. 37). After reviewing recent literature on the origin of the Logos doctrine, Menoud concludes that this holds true for the Logos idea as well (p. 53). There is no general agreement on the attitude of the Fourth Gospel toward sacraments. Menoud, curiously enough, rejects the view of Craig and Cullmann that the gospel is sacramentalist (p. 54).

4. According to Menoud, it is increasingly recognized that the language and thought of the gospel reappear in the three epistles of John. He is not much impressed by the arguments of C. H. Dodd, now set forth in the commentary on *The Johannine Epistles* (London, 1946), which seem to me to be of the utmost importance.

5. The Rylands papyrus of John and the Egerton papyrus of the "unknown gospel" now make it impossible to date the Fourth Gospel very much later than the year 100. It is not so difficult as formerly to hold that it was written by the son of Zebedee. At least it could have been written in old age by a contemporary of Jesus. "Recent researches have correctly brought the following point to light: from the literary as well as from the theological point of view, John rests upon tradition and surpasses it; he proves that he has at the same time fidelity and liberty. He knows the gospel tradition; sometimes he follows it, sometimes he departs from it. He knows the theology of the Son of Man, by which the nascent church expressed its faith in the Kyrios, but he is not

afraid to express the message of Jesus in a new language and with new thoughts. In brief, John acts with independence, the sovereignty of someone who would have been able to say, *la tradition, c'est moi!* At the end of the apostolic age, there remained but one man who could have spoken so" (pp. 76f).

Perhaps, as Menoud inclines to believe, this was the son of Zebedee. But the identification of him as such nevertheless does not solve the historical problem which, as the above quotation shows, the Swiss scholar recognizes. Even when we grant that the synoptics show some of the same tendencies as the Fourth Gospel, and agree that the two formulations of the tradition are "more or less parallel and contemporary," it still remains true that the Synoptics are relatively much more traditional and the Fourth Gospel is relatively much more imaginative.

SHERMAN E. JOHNSON

Episcopal Theological School

Greek Piety. By Martin Persson Nilsson. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1948. Pp. viii + 200. 15 s.

The aim of this book, according to its eminent author, long professor of classical archaeology at Lund, is "to set forth the religious attitude towards the world and the religious view of the life of man, as these changed with the times." It was translated from Swedish by H. J. Rose of St. Andrews; therefore no comment on the excellent English is necessary. Very few footnotes are included because of the author's detailed historical study, *Die Geschichte der griechische Religion*, of which the first volume was reviewed in *ATR* 30 (1948), 64-67. The second volume, soon to appear, supplies sources for the second half of this book.

The book is divided into three long chapters. The first two deal with "religion in the archaic period" and "the dissolution" in the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. The position reached by the end of dissolution is set forth thus (p. 91):

Whereas the age of enlightenment sought to show that belief in the gods was false, and so to uproot it, statesmen now took up the position that, while certainly an illusion, it ought to be retained and upheld to keep the restless, passionate, and unreasonable masses in order. One could hardly degrade religion more than that.

This statement, which has contemporary application, may be compared with the studies of B.

Farrington, *Science and Politics in Antiquity*, which, while somewhat exaggerated, show the use made of religion in the Hellenistic age by some of its supporters.

The long chapter on "rebuilding" has special interest for students of early Christianity, for it sets forth in clear and magisterial style the elements of the religious life in the world into which Christianity was born. Simply to list its detailed contents is to indicate something of the great usefulness of Nilsson's work. "The new cosmology, power, astrology, monotheism, transcendentalism, occultism and theosophy, the mystery-religions, folk-belief, the daemonizing of religion, the social side"—all are relevant for anyone who wishes to understand what it was that early Christianity offered, and what those who took it wanted. For instance, the thought of Ignatius of Antioch finds its setting in nearly every one of these sections. Nilsson makes more of the rise and struggles of ancient science than do most writers on religion, and this emphasis makes his book especially valuable. He discusses such works as the *Hermetica*, the writing of Bolos of Mendes on sympathies and antipathies, the pseudo-Aristotelian *On the Universe*, Celsus, Sallustius, and the magical papyri. He concludes with a section on the relation of Christianity to the religious life of the Graeco-Roman world.

It cast away the cosmological speculations and went back to the old picture of the world. The mystics of late antiquity taught that he who knows his own real nature, he who has *gnosis*, or illumination, is absorbed in God. Christianity substituted a childlike trust in the heavenly Father, "Our Father, which art in heaven."

Interestingly enough, this picture is true in a matter of geographical detail, when early Christians abandoned the idea of a spherical earth in favor of a four-square gospel. Irenaeus and Theophilus seem to be the first to do so, but they were not the last (on their sources cf. W. A. Heidel, *The Frame of the Ancient Greek Maps*, New York, 1937). This is an unfortunate instance; but to avoid gnostic sphere-speculation almost any price could have been paid.

Nilsson's book will be permanently valuable, and anyone who wishes to understand the early church must use it as one of his indispensable tools.

ROBERT M. GRANT

University of the South

The Apostolic Fathers. Translated by Francis X. Glimm, Joseph M.-F. Marique, and Gerald G. Walsh. New York: Cima Publishing Company, 1947. Pp. xiv + 401. \$4.00.

This volume is the first of a long series called *The Fathers of the Church* which is appearing under the editorship of Dr. Ludwig Schopp and a board well known to students of the fathers. It will eventually include about seventy volumes, and if all are of equal merit, patristic studies in America will enjoy a genuine renaissance. We may note that another and competing series, intended for more advanced students, is being put out by the Newman Book Shop in Westminster, Maryland. The renewed vigor of Roman Catholic scholarship should force non-Romans to take the fathers more seriously, though the contributions of Lightfoot and Lake should not be forgotten.

The present volume includes the works or fragments of Clement, Ignatius, Polycarp (with *Martyrdom*), Hermas, and Papias, as well as the Didache, "Barnabas," and the letter to Diognetus. Except for Hermas, "Diognetus," and Papias, the edition of Bihlmeyer has been used. The translations are clear and idiomatic, with few exceptions (e.g. Noah is Noe on p. 15 and Noa on p. 69; and on p. 15 [*I Clem.* 7:6] he "preached penance"). The notes, apart from a tendency to use terminology of a later period than the second century, are brief and to the point.

A few minor additions and corrections may be of value to those who use the book. On pp. 29 and 72 a reference to the Gospel of the Egyptians and P. Oxy. iv. 655 would have been appropriate. On pp. 206f notes illustrating the origin of Barnabas' theories about animals could be added, e.g.:

Barn. 10:3 swine: a similarly derogatory description in Plutarch, *Quaest. Conviv.* iv. 5; Barn. 10:4 birds: from *Ep. Aristaeae* 146; Barn. 10:5 fish: cf. Oppian, *Hal.* i. 142, 305f; Barn. 10:6 hare: cf. Aelian, *Nat. anim.* xiii. 12; Barn. 10:7 hyena: cf. Aelian, *Nat. anim.* i. 25; Barn. 10:8 weasel: misunderstanding of *Ep. Aristaeae* 165.

On p. 231 "at least five fragments on papyri" of Hermas should be "at least sixteen." On p. 353 a better guess for the last two chapters of "Diognetus" would be Melito of Sardis (cf. Bonner's edition of his *Homily on the Passion*). Finally, something has gone wrong in note 5 on

p. 382. In discussing Andreas and Arethas of Caesarea there is a misleading reference to "D.C.B. 39"; this refers to the abridgment of the *Dictionary of Christian Biography*, which was not too successfully accomplished. The *DCB* itself (I. 155) places Arethas correctly in the tenth century. And the latest edition of Altaner's *Patrologie* to which I have access (Mulhouse, 1941) places Andreas in the first half of the sixth century (p. 437).

ROBERT M. GRANT

University of the South

Church, Law and Society. By Gustaf Aulén. Introduction by Nels F. S. Ferré. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1948, pp. 111. \$2.00.

The Hewett Lectures for 1947 by the Bishop of Strängnäs form a suggestive book on an important subject.

He begins by distinguishing between two types of attitude that the Church has taken toward society: that represented by pietism, assuming the essential separation of the Christian from the world, and the need for a radical change effected in the world by converted men, and that attitude represented by modernism, which assumes the idealistic view of man and history, reinterpreting Christianity to become an ally of the humanitarian effort and to realize progressively the Kingdom of God on earth. These two attitudes have recently received a critical challenge from the newer trend in theology which he characterizes as radical and realistic: realistic in that it seeks to return to the essentials of Christianity, radical in its effort to do this without compromise.

Aulén then outlines four aspects of this new theology as he has observed it from the perspective of the Swedish church. (1) It has stressed the meaning of salvation as a gift of God's grace, God's *agape*. (2) It finds history to become meaningful as the locus of the dramatic contest between God and evil. (3) It reveals a reawakened consciousness of the Church. (4) It has reinterpreted the relationship between Christianity and the world.

This final point becomes, in fact, the theme of Aulén's book. "God does not work only through His Gospel, only through Christ and His Church; He works also through His Law, the Universal Law of the Creator. . . . He also uses as His instruments men who don't belong

to His Church" (p. 17-18). The remainder of the book becomes a discussion of the essential problem of apologetics: how shall a Church which believes that salvation is only through Christ speak with relevance to an unconverted world, avoiding the twin dangers of pious isolation and of self-distorting involvement?

The essential concept for the resolution of this problem is that of the Law. "The Law is no way to God, but it is the way to all human relationships" (p. 4). He precedes his systematic discussion of the Law by an analysis of the decline of the sense of justice in the recent years of crisis, and the parallel reawakening of conscience both within Christianity and outside it, with special reference to the experience of the Church in Norway during the war. Yet the general decline of the sense of righteousness suggests to him the need of examining the moral vigor of the Church, and he speaks especially of two charges commonly made against it: that the Church has been otherworldly and that it has claimed to be the exclusive foundation of righteousness. An important discussion arises from this as to whether "natural man" can do anything that is good; and again, as to the proper attitude of the Christian toward the secular authorities. These two problems, discussed in the light of Reformation doctrine, raise again the question of the relevance of the Gospel to the world of history.

Turning, then, to this question, he finds in the neglect of the proper understanding of the Law and of its relation to the Gospel the chief source of the social ineffectiveness of the Church. The Law, supplanted by the Gospel as a way of salvation, must be retained because of its essential function as "the foundation that God . . . has established for the living together of humanity" (p. 62). It differs from "natural law," which is merely "the idea of general, rational human conscience" by having a specific content, the will of God revealed as Love: "It is the *dynamis* that aims at and leads men to take care of their neighbors. . . . This universal claim is then the fundamental principle of the justice that God erects as regards the human fellowship" (p. 66). It becomes the framework for the life of the converted man. "We cannot acquire salvation through obedience, but on the other hand we cannot live the life of salvation without obedience, we lose it through disobedience" (p. 71). Aulén then considers the Law as a foundation of justice superior to the com-

monly accepted notions of human rights or human dignity.

This suggests the *modus vivendi* which Christians may find in a secular world in a time of crisis. Theologians must hold the doctrine of the Law in such a way that they do not claim that Christianity alone has a sense of justice and righteousness. To do this would be to assert a false perfection in the Church, forgetting that man even when redeemed is simultaneously righteous and sinner. The Law of the Creator has been and continues to be perceived by non-Christians, with whom Christians thankfully cooperate in the common social task. It is the responsibility of the Church to support with all power the primacy of justice in a world of increasing concentrations of power.

Bishop Aulén may not have made in this brief book the final analysis of the Church's position in society, but his readers will find a rare blending of theological certainty, breadth of tolerance, and apologetical skill. They will find suggestive treatments of the perennial difficulties raised by the opposition of justice and love, sin and salvation, church and state.

CLEMENT W. WELSH

Bexley Hall

William Temple, Archbishop of Canterbury: His Life and Letters. By F. A. Iremonger. Oxford. \$6.50.

Temple's laugh may be the key to his life. "It was laughter," writes Dr. Julian Huxley, "in the grand manner and on the largest scale, earth-shaking laughter that shook the laugher too. While it infected everybody who heard it with cheerfulness, it was a potent disinfectant against all meanness, prurience, and pettiness. It was the intensely valuable complement of Temple's deep seriousness." Laughter echoes through the pages of this official, yet salty biography. It stems far below the surface of a man who in the most diverse conferences was counted on to perform what he called his "parlour trick of fitting everybody's pet point into a coherent document when they thought they were contradicting one another." "A conveniently mediating mind which was yet without smudges"—this is perhaps the best phrase Dr. Iremonger uses of the Archbishop.

In addition to the abundant hints at his character-structure, the book deals adequately with Temple's manifold activities, which it compares, from the York period on, to the burst of

stars from a rocket. Few great men have spent themselves so completely in many-sided work; there are strong words of condemnation for the antiquated ecclesiastical machinery which hastened his death.

Those who revere Temple for the dialectical realism by which he related the Faith to every side of human life will find its development carefully plotted. His reaction as a youth to the slumming of the Rugby Club Camp and the Oxford Settlement Houses was not Lady Bountiful's. His life-long contact with labor in the Workers' Educational Association is shown to be an emancipation from a purely academic career. (It also caused him to be placed on "a list of dangerous—or was it merely 'suspicious'!—persons" prepared during the first World War by the C.I.D.) The influence of R. H. Tawney (author of *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism*), from their boyhood at Rugby

until Temple's death, cannot be overestimated. Theologically, his final shift from idealism to redemptionism is even more interesting than his earlier change from broad to central churchmanship.

All in all—allowing for Dr. Iremonger's tendency, as Temple's friend, to dwell on the eulogies of other friends—this is the book to begin the veneration of William Temple, who typifies the sanity and bravery which Christians must show in the future if they are to reflect "light piercing unilluminated darkness." For, as T. S. Eliot's chorus sings of an earlier Archbishop:

From such ground springs that which forever
renews the earth
Though it is forever denied. Therefore, O God,
we thank Thee
Who hast given such blessing to Canterbury.

WILLIAM M. WEBER

Littleton, N. H.

NOTES ON NEW BOOKS

The Bible, the Book of God and Man. By James A. Montgomery. Ventnor (N.J.) Publishers, Inc., 1948, pp. 108. \$2.75.

The central theme of this little book is clearly indicated by the title and is underlined on the opening page where the author characterizes as "unfortunate" the terms Old and New Testament, resulting from an early mistranslation of the Hebrew word signifying a covenant or agreement between two parties, God and man. Throughout large portions of the Bible, human history is narrated with the purpose of teaching the fear of God and social morality. What is true of the Old Testament, to which Professor Montgomery has devoted half a century of research, is equally true of the New. Jesus, the divine Word made flesh, lived as man in the midst of human society, clothing his teaching in parables drawn from common life and experience. His apostles, as well as other chief characters in the narratives of the Gospels, are not idealized as devoid of human failings. Particularly is the personal element and human situation indispensable to any correct understanding of Paul's epistles. Familiar and even elementary as such points may appear to the careful student of the Bible, their disregard by altogether too many readers is a constant source of misconception. There is also much in this

small volume which affords a wholesomely refreshing antidote to an apparent tendency in some of the current output in the field of Biblical theology to emphasize the divine revelation by minimizing or ignoring the human and historical factors which condition its reception.

O. J. F. S.

The Song of Songs. By Leroy Waterman. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1948, pp. x + 88. \$2.00.

The author's thesis is that the Song of Songs as it is preserved in the Old Testament is a Judean recension of a dramatic poem which was composed in Northern Israel between 925 and 870 B.C. In its original form, which the author believes can be recovered by transposing 3:6-4:6 to the beginning of the book, it portrayed the rejection of Solomon's advances by the Shunammite girl who had ministered to David in his last illness. Following his death she preferred to return to her shepherd lover rather than to be taken into Solomon's harem. The poem was thus hostile to Solomon. The Judean redactor corrected this, to him, incredible attitude by moving the opening passage to its present position, 3:6-4:6.

Whether or not Dr. Waterman's interpretation meets with general acceptance, he has pro-

vided us with a very beautiful translation of the Song. His textual and critical notes are full and illuminating. And the publishers are to be congratulated on the extraordinarily attractive format of the book.

C. A. S.

The Aegean and the Orient in the Second Millennium B.C. By Helene J. Kantor. Bloomington, Indiana: The Principia Press, 1947, pp. 108, Plates xxvi.

Though a highly technical monograph, this study serves to restore an equilibrium in our thought about the spread of culture in the eastern Mediterranean which had been somewhat disturbed by our enthusiasm about the great civilization of Crete which had been brought to light by Sir Arthur Evans and others. Miss Kantor has succeeded in showing that the Mycenaean culture of the mainland of the Aegean was, if not equal, at least a good second to that of Crete during the period under consideration. Indeed, in later times, the culture of the mainland far outstripped that of Crete, so much so that it became the bridge over which the rich and ancient cultures of Western Asia passed into Greece, and thence into Rome and Europe. It was the path followed by the messengers of the Cross.

S. A. B. M.

Zur Engelchristologie im Urchristentum. By Wilhelm Michaelis. Basel: Heinrich Majer, 1942. Pp. 240.

This volume, the first of the series *Gegenwartsfragen Biblischer Theologie*, appeared during the war as a reply to Martin Werner's 730-page *Die Entstehung des christlichen Dogmas* (Bern, 1941). Werner's work is an attempt to show how dogma developed from the thoroughgoing eschatology of the earliest church. Like the phoenix, it arose from its ashes. The chief link which Werner found between the old and the new was the idea of Jesus as an (or the) angel of God. This idea, originally eschatological and apocalyptic, was the source of the later development of Christology. In passing it may be said that without regard to Werner's main thesis he provided a valuable and interesting collection of materials and often illuminates subsidiary points.

His thesis itself, however, is completely demolished in the present work of his colleague on

the Bern faculty. By a careful and detailed examination of the texts which Werner adduced to prove his point, Michaelis shows conclusively that there is no angel of this sort in Jewish apocalyptic, in early Christianity, or in the ante-Nicene texts Werner quotes. Where in literature off the main stream the idea occurs, the "angel" is not the sort whose existence Werner is trying to prove (p. 153). In short, *Engelchristologie* is not the key to the history of early Christian thought.

It may be observed, however, that the problem set by Werner still remains. How did apocalyptic eschatology become philosophical theology? Perhaps the clearest instance of transition is to be found in Justin's *Dialogue with Trypho*, where both elements meet. But the method for studying such a meeting is not the examination of individual ideas, necessary as this may be, but the analysis of Justin's thought as a whole, including his literary and theological method. The results would be less startling, but they would be more convincing.

R. M. G.

Die Religion in den griechischen Zauberpapyri. By Martin P. Nilsson. Lund: Gleerup, 1948. Pp. 34.

The magical papyri, mentioned briefly in Nilsson's *Greek Piety*, are here treated in more detail from the standpoint of the history of Greek religion. Nilsson made his own index of the papyri as edited by K. Preisendanz in *Papyri graecae magicae* I-II (1928-31), listing the names of gods and goddesses, Semitic and Greek, and also astrological terms, along with Fate, Necessity, and Tyche (chance). The contents of each heading are here discussed in some detail.

Nilsson agrees with Festugière that the relation of magic to the gods is essentially opposed to that of religion. But magical writers frequently use elements of religion for their own purposes, and therefore these papyri cast light on the religion of their day. The papyri include hymns to the gods, which especially in the introductions are very similar to those used in cult practice.

From the Christian point of view it is especially significant that, as Nilsson remarks, the Jewish influence is extraordinarily strong. "No names occur so often as Iao, Sabaoth, Adonai, except for Helios, who occurs about as often as Sabaoth." The magical papyri

make use of names of angels and archangels, of cherubim and seraphim, of Jacob, Isaac and Abraham, and even of Old Testament narratives (pp. 5-9). Nilsson mentions the well-known exorcism in the name of "Jesus the god of the Hebrews."

To understand the underworld of the environment of the early church these notes will prove most helpful. To prove this we need only recall Acts 19:19 (with the interesting "Notes on Book-Burning" of A. S. Pease in *Munera Studiosa*, edited by Shepherd and Johnson for W. H. P. Hatch).

R. M. G.

Great Shorter Works of Pascal. By E. Cailliet and J. C. Blankenagel. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1948, pp. 231. \$4.50.

The standard fourteen volume collection of Pascal's works by Brunshvieg gives about six volumes to the *Pensées* and the *Provincial Letters*. Cailliet and Blankenagel have excerpted from the remaining eight volumes a great variety of pieces which present Pascal as a geometrician, a physicist, an inventor, a convert, a spiritual director, a theologian, and a religious controversialist. Here among other jewels are to be found a marvellous letter to his sister on the meaning of death, an admirable digest of the theological issues connected with "grace," the account of his own conversion, and some deeply Biblical prayers on the meaning of sickness.

The authors provide a helpful introduction which sets the selections in their chronological and biographical framework. At times their devotion to their hero reaches excessive proportions, as on page 32: "Like the *Provincial Letters* these masterpieces truly reveal Pascal as the last prophet of Israel."

W. J. W.

Catholic Faith and Modern Theologies: The Theology of Emil Brunner. By John W. Moran. Worcester: Heffernan Press, 1948, pp. 96. \$2.00.

The Professor of Dogmatic Theology at Weston College undertakes to refute Brunner by selecting brief sentences from four of his early works and then stating the Roman Catholic counter-theses. The books selected are *The Mediator, God and Man, The Philosophy of Religion*, and *The Divine Imperative*.

Professor Moran tries to be fair to Brunner, but fails to understand Brunner's position on revelation. The failure to see that Brunner's dynamic view of revelation is not the same as the Roman Catholic static use of scripture as itself revelation in a fundamentalist sense explains why the Jesuit Professor feels he has refuted Brunner by the Roman Catholic exegesis of proof texts. The issue is never squarely joined on the basic problem; therefore glancing blows on other doctrines of the faith are not a convincing encounter. Notwithstanding its failure to meet the real Brunner the book crisply states Vatican doctrine on original sin, justification by works, the Church, virginity, marriage, divorce, the mass as sacrifice, the contemplative life, and Jesuit moral theology.

W. J. W.

The Church and the Social Order. By S. L. Greenslade. London: S. C. M. Press, 1948, pp. 128. 6 s.

Canon Greenslade's tightly packed little book is a valuable addition to the stream of literature popularizing Troeltsch's monumental work. The principal points of contribution made are: (1) the wealth of concrete instances in which the Church made the difference for possible advance, (2) the righting of the balance of the judgment on the character of Luther's share in the changes of the sixteenth century, and (3) the providing of an Anglican alongside the Lutheran and Calvinistic social policies. The last alone would make the book worth double its price and render it indispensable in an Anglican Seminary.

Two examples of this compression will convey the flavor of Greenslade's work:

There are two kingdoms, of Christ and of the world; two early authorities, preacher and prince; two laws, Christian and natural; two aspect of the individual, his person and his office. The temptation is to take the first member of each pair and from them to construct Luther's conception of the religious life, supposing that the rest is merely secular. Such a dualism would not be a fair interpretation of Luther.

Hooker's attitude to monarchy, is much more constitutional than the absolutism of the mid-sixteenth century. "So is the power of the king over all and in all limited that unto all his proceedings the law itself is a rule." Law rests upon consent, and the commonwealth must not "clean resign up herself and make over this power wholly into the hands of anyone."

H. H. H.

Zen. By Alan W. Watts. Published by James Ladd Delkin, Stanford, California, 1948, pp. 47. \$2.75.

This sumptuously printed booklet of less than forty-seven pages, in an edition limited to one thousand copies, will appeal especially to those who remember the author's earlier work on *The Spirit of Zen*. Naturally, in its brief compass, it cannot pretend to give any very comprehensive account of the Zen philosophy. It may indeed be doubted if a much larger volume, assuming the identity of the Chinese C'han, the Indian Dhyana, and the Japanese Zen (which, at any rate in its development, was primarily a philosophy for the military caste for the inculcation of a stoical hardness) could ever properly establish a doctrinal synthesis. Still less is the relation of Zen to the Chinese Tao, or the Yin-Yang monad, obvious.

To the Christian mystic the attempt to reconcile the paradox of reality by even the most suggestive of Zen symbols will seem vain. The ultimate reality whereby we are "hid with Christ in God" is beyond the reach of either the Monistic or the Dualistic hypothesis. The fact of the separateness and individual value of the human soul makes impossible the acceptance of the Sufi identification of the "Thyself" and the "Myself." It makes us even doubtful as to the validity of Keble's aspiration that "in the ocean of Thy love we lose ourselves in heaven above."

This is of course an inadequate summary of Mr. Watts's *Zen*, but, with all due allowances, the reader will find it difficult to describe the volume as (since Suzuki) "the only general study of Zen now published in America."

H. H. G.

Man's Restless Search. By Barbara Spofford Morgan. New York: Harpers, 1949, pp. 224. \$2.50.

Dr. Morgan, in this reissue of her book *Skeptic's Search for God*, has given us a sketch of the approach of one seeker for deity. She follows first an intellectual approach, arguing that without belief in God the presence of purpose and plan in the world is unexplained; then, a mystical approach, in which she admits that "mystic experience cannot be explained," but argues that it points towards a reality with whom the mystic is in touch;

finally, looking at man as a moral agent, she argues that "the religious nature of morality" appears as man attempts to understand the meaning of that imperative which drives him towards the loving and right deed.

The conclusion of the matter, for the author, is that despite the paradoxical nature of the idea of God, belief in him alone can give us the issue of "human creativeness."

This book is an interesting, well-written volume, useful particularly for those who would reject altogether the religious interpretation of life. It is not particularly important, as a weighty contribution to the subject, but has its value in that it shows how one woman, of high intelligence and honest mind has been led to belief in God, almost despite herself. It may therefore be useful for others who are in the same state.

W. N. P.

The Home of the Rural Pastor. By Ralph A. Felton. Madison, New Jersey: Drew Theological Seminary, 1948, pp. 111. 40¢.

The Home of the Rural Pastor is the latest of a group of studies related to the rural church made by graduate students at Drew Theological Seminary under the supervision of Dr. Ralph A. Felton.

This study consists of an appraisal of the actual conditions of the dwellings furnished 1171 rural ministers of twelve denominations, including the Protestant Episcopal Church, in every section of the United States. Data were gathered through answers by these ministers and their wives to a questionnaire aimed at a thorough and comprehensive understanding of the actual conditions of the buildings, grounds and furnishings of these dwellings. Among the subjects dealt with are: ownership, size, construction, plan, furnishings, condition and insurance of the dwelling; the minister's study; the kitchen; the laundry; the grounds and landscaping; the garage; recreational facilities; the garden; repairs and improvements. An effort is made to arrive at what might be considered a norm for an adequate rural church minister's home.

The study is comprehensive and very well done. It has value for church governing boards in understanding and meeting the housing needs of their ministers. It could be of great value to any church congregation planning to buy or build a dwelling for their minister. While

some of the material is relevant only to the rural church, most of it can be used also in regard to the church in the city.

E. D. B.

Sermons for the New Age. Edited by Sam Nader. Morehouse-Gorham. \$3.00.

That such a number of outstanding present-day preachers, of varied denominational backgrounds, find utterance within the space of a single volume upon aspects of a single theme is a health symptom of a dawning day. The call is, more than ever, to "live for great ends." We ask with concern can "the life-blood of an understanding heart" flow through the "otherwise lifeless frame," the United Nations. At the "bar of our own conscience," we become deeply aware of the "ankle-deep" nature of our religion, of "the abiding 'tensions' within life." Only as we dwell upon the wealth of meaning in such convictions as "God is in the struggle," and "Christ is here," do we even approximate, as a possibility, the erection upon "the ashes of doubt" of "the beauty of faith." This book will be a source of strength for many.

B. G. L.

The Authorized Daily Prayer Book. Revised edition. Hebrew text, English translation, commentary, and notes. By Joseph H. Hertz. New York: Bloch, 1948, pp. xxiii + 1120. \$5.00.

This beautiful commentary is not only scholarly but devout, and will enable the Christian

student to get the "feel" of Jewish piety and devotion, as well as to understand the way in which Jewish liturgy has grown through the centuries. Episcopalians or Anglicans should certainly take up the work with a prejudice in its favor: our religion is liturgical too, our conception of religion is practical too, our faith is enshrined in worship too—indeed, in a Prayer Book. The work supplements and in a measure takes the place of the *Companion to the Prayer Book* by the late Israel Abrahams (1914, rev. ed. 1922), a treasure-trove to many a Gentile student of liturgies, New Testament, and Judaism.

Mediaeval Panorama. By G. G. Coulton. Cambridge Univ. Press; N. Y.: Macmillan, 1947, pp. xi + 801. \$6.50.

For some reason this book was overlooked by the *Anglican Theological Review* when it first appeared in 1938. The present reissue enables us to call attention to it. Like everything that the late Professor Coulton put his pen to, this book is supremely *interesting*, from cover to cover. It is illustrated with drawings and photographs, but even more fully with citations from current mediaeval history and literature. One reads a chapter of this book and feels that he has *been* in the middle ages for a period! Every possible phase of human life is described and discussed in the 52 chapters, and if anyone can lay the book down without being something more of a "mediaevalist" than he ever was before, he must be a most unmovable person!

F. C. G.

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